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Abstract 
 
Michel Foucault's relationship to several philosophers -whom Foucault himself declared openly his philosophical 
allegiances, such as Nietzsche, Marx or Heidegger- has been widely and repeatedly analyzed without much 
discord. His self proclaimed Kantianism on the other hand, starting particularly after his essay entitled “Qu’est-
ce que la critique?” published in 1978, -in which Foucault provides his own interpretation of Kant's essay 
entitled “What is Enlightenment?”-, had been subjected to fierce criticisms. Primarily after Habermas' 
accusations Foucault's late return to Kant was mainly considered as an apologetic move, an inconsistent 
proclamation that does not fit well with the rest of his philosophical oeuvre; a sort of criticism which insists that 
this supposedly penitent move is an indication of Foucault finally realizing the dangers of ignoring to provide a 
normative background to his critical philosophy. 
 
With the new evidence provided by the recent publication of Foucault’s complementary doctoral thesis (1961) 
on Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, this work defends the opposite thesis and puts forward 
that Foucault’s relationship to Kant is much more intricate than previously thought. His Commentary on Kant’s 
Anthropology provides enough evidence suggesting that his first encounters with (and immanent criticism of) 
Kantian philosophy more or less defines the path Foucault’s own critical thought will follow. This work argues 
that Foucauldian critical project is a continuation of Kant’s critical enterprise, while transforming it, in order to 
leave as little room possible for the transcendental. Therefore, at least during his archaeological period 
Foucauldian philosophy can be thought of as a sincere struggle with Kant and the philosophical link between 
these two philosophers should not be discarded hastily. 
 
Keywords: Michel Foucault, Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Introduction to 
Kant’s Anthropology 
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Özet 
Michel Foucault’nun felsefi bağlarını açıkça ortaya koyduğu Nietzsche, Marx ya da Heidegger gibi düşünürlerle 
olan ilişkisi, çok da aksi yönde bir iddia ortaya atılmadan, çokça üzerinde yazılan, düşünülen konular olmuştur. 
Ama özellikle 1978 yılında yayınladığı “Qu’est-ce que la critique?” yazısı ile kendisini Kantçı felsefenin varisi 
olarak göstermesi, başta Habermas olmak üzere birçok düşünürün tepkisini çekmiş, bu bildirge içten ve tutarlı 
bulunmamış ve Foucault’nun normatif temeller sağlayamadığı felsefesini Kantçı geleneğe sonradan neredeyse 
absürd bir şekilde bağlayarak eleştirilerden kendisini kurtarmaya çalıştığı iddia edilmiştir. Bu Kant’a geri 
dönüşün Foucault’nun temel felsefi görüşlerine tamamen ters düştüğü savunulmuştur. 
 
Ama yakın zamanda gün ışığına çıkan Foucault’nun Kant’ın Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View adlı 
eserine bir giriş olarak yazdığı ikinci doktora tezi bize üstte sunulan ve Foucault ve Kant arasında ortaya 
konulabilecek tutarlı bir ilişkiyi doğrudan reddeden görüşü reddetmeye olanak sağlıyor. 1961 yılında, yani 
Kant’ı felsefeyi antropolojik bir uykuya mahkum etmekle suçladığı The Order of Things adlı eserinden yaklaşık 
5 sene önce, Foucault bu ikinci doktora tezinde Kant ile olan felsefi ilişkisinin doğasını çok daha açık bir şekilde 
ortaya koyuyor. Hatta bu çalışma bize Foucault’nun kendi erken dönem felsefesinin yoğun bir şekilde Kant’tan 
etkilenerek şekillendirdiğini gösteriyor, ve bu iki düşünür arasındaki herhangi bir felsefi bağı daha en baştan silip 
atan düşünürlerin aksine, Foucault’nun düşüncesinin Kantçı geleneğin temelde bir devamı olduğunu, ve 
Foucault’nun Kant’ın düşüncesinde 1961 gibi erken bir zamanda gördüğü problemlerden kaçınmak için en 
azından kendi erken dönem felsefesini bu şekilde şekillendirdiğini bizlere gösteriyor.   
 
 
Anahtar sözcükler: Michel Foucault, Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 
Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology 
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“Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing awe and admiration: the starry 
heavens above us and the moral law within us.” 
       Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 
 
 
A- 1 “Foucault, a Kantian? Who […] is kidding whom?”1 
 
Shortly before his death, in a series of lectures, interviews and essays2 (most well-
known of which poses a reflection on Kant’s article entitled “An Answer to the Question: 
What is Enlightenment?”) starting from early 1980s, Michel Foucault startlingly situated his 
critical philosophy under the lineage of Immanuel Kant, and proclaimed that under the split 
established by Kant in modern Western philosophy (dividing it into two camps3: 1-“analytics 
of truth -“philosophy as formal ontology of truth”, or “critical analysis of knowledge”- and 2-
“ontology of the present” –or, “historical ontology of ourselves-”) his own works should be 
considered under the pole of the latter camp along with other members of the same line of 
thought, such as Fichte, Hegel, Comte, Weber, Nietzsche, Husserl and Frankfurterschule4. 
Considering Foucault’s anti-humanist stand, his blatant criticism of the Enlightenment 
principles, and equally importantly, the nature of his treatment of Kant and Kantian 
philosophy, particularly in The Order of Things (chapters 7, 8 and 9), although praising him, 
in this text, for awaking philosophy from a dogmatic slumber only to accuse him, in return, 
for lulling it back, this time, to an anthropological sleep5 (a philosophical anthropology 
                                                 
1 Schmidt and Wartenberg, 1994, p. 284 
2 Also in an article he wrote for Dictionnaire des Philosophes under the entry that bears his 
own name, using a pseudonym “Maurice Florence”, Foucault starts defining his own 
philosophy with these words: “To the extent that Foucault fits into the philosophical tradition, 
it is the critical tradition of Kant, and his project could be called a Critical History of 
Thought." 
3 Foucault says, in the lecture delivered in Berkeley, in 1983, this split occurs not as a result of 
the Critique itself, but as a result of the way such questions “What are we now? What is our 
actualité?” are asked in Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?”, that is, the way that the Critique is 
instrumentalized toward the present, while the philosopher takes his distance as much as 
possible equipped with the knowledge that he is and his own reason are limited (thus finite) 
by the historical conditions of his present. 
4 Foucault, M. “The Political Technology of Individuals”, in Technologies of the Self, ed. 
Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton, The University of Massachusetts 
Pres, 1988, p. 145 
5 It is the belief that all the philosophy’s questions, particularly the ones that Kant asked in his 
Critique of Pure Reason – respectively, 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What 
am I permitted to hope for? - in the end, could and should be wrapped around and referred to 
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formally “caught in the bind of treating ‘man’”6 –“Man”, as the epistemic structure of 
modernity, and man, as the empirical content of that structure- as both an object of empirical 
inquiry and the transcendental ground of all knowledge), and since the greater part of his 
career is spent “showing that every alleged victory of Enlightenment marked the triumph of a 
new and insidious form of domination”; it should be no surprise that people would most likely 
wonder: “Foucault, a Kantian? And Kant, a Nietzschean? Who, one might reasonably ask, is 
kidding whom?”7   
 
In one of his last essays, Foucault elucidates in more detail the reasons why he situates 
his work within the critical tradition of Kant: in Kant’s discussion of the Enlightenment, what 
occupies the centre of the debate, what concerns Kant the most is not “a theory, a doctrine, or 
a permanent body of knowledge”, rather, it a distinctively modern attitude, an ethos, “a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is one and the same time the historical 
analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond them.” Similar to Kant, Foucault shows his interest in the analysis of the limits of our 
reason, of the ways in which we produce our truth, the conditions of possibility of knowledge, 
only to look for a possibility to transgress them; not, this time unlike Kant, “to seek universal 
structures of all knowledge or all possible moral action”. Therefore, not deviating from the 
Kantian spirit entirely, Foucault offers his Nietzschean version of the critique (more akin to 
philosophizing with a hammer), a critique that opens the way to possible transgression8: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
a fourth question “Was ist der Mensch?” (“What is the human being?”), which becomes 
Kant’s central question in the Opus Posthumum. For Kant, in his introductory lectures on 
Logic, the first question is answered by Metaphysics, the second by Morals, the third by 
Religion, and the fourth by Anthropology. “In reality, however, all these might be reckoned 
under anthropology, since the first three questions refer to the last.” In the later parts of this 
work I shall explain why the centrality of the fourth question, around which the other three are 
subsumed, becomes important for Foucault, in the Commentary (Introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology) and in The Order of Things (henceforth OT in the endnotes and references), 
chapter 7. 
6 Schmidt and Wartenberg, 1994, ibid 
7 Ibid. There are several other articles expressing the “absurdity” of Foucault’s self-professed 
late return to Kantianism: Bernstein (1994), Freundlieb in “Rationalism vs. Irrationalism? 
Habermas’ Response to Foucault”, Gordon (1986), Habermas (1987 and 1989), Harpham 
(1994), Hiley (1985), Pryor (1998), Taylor (1984), and White (1986). 
8 For a more detailed account on what Foucault means by “limit attitude” and “transgression” 
and further links establishing a connection between him and Kant, see M. Foucault, “A 
Preface to Transgression” in D.F. Bouchard ed., Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: 
Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault (Ithaca: Cornell University Pres, 1977) 
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“Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with 
universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to 
constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, 
saying. In that sense, criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a 
metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. 
Archaeological – and not transcendental – in the sense that it will not seek to identify the 
universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the 
instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. 
And . . . genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it 
is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has 
made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or 
think.”9 
   
For most of the early commentators to this debate, this “late return” to Kant indicated 
major contradictions. Jürgen Habermas claimed that, this “apologetic return to Kant”10 
designated not only a contradiction for the Foucauldian philosophy, but also indicated a 
manifestation on the part of Foucault that his critical theory needed and lacked, eventually, a 
normative framework, which Foucauldian corpus almost en masse challenges and subverts. 
After all, Habermas argues, Foucault’s critical philosophy can not justify the need for a 
resistance although Foucault so aptly demonstrates why certain truth regimes (or “games of 
truth”), discourses, practices and relations of power are problematic, why they should be 
realized as historically contingent, thus constructed not necessarily as a result of, so called, 
“scientific, humanist, progressive” processes, “so that the social and political violence that 
had always been a part and parcel of these regimes could be criticized and attacked.”11 
Criticism, on its own, does not justify, nor can it muster a necessary motive for resistance, for 
the very criticism of Enlightenment principles by Foucault also undermines the normative 
grounds for such resistance. Thus, Foucault’s critical thought “sees itself compelled to a 
relativist self denial and [thus] can give no account of the normative foundations of its own 
                                                 
9 Foucault, M. (1984), ”What is Enlightenment?”, in Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader 
(New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 46, quoted from Amy Allen’s “Foucault and Enlightenment”. 
10 Richard Bernstein (1994), too, describes Foucault’s late essay on Enlightenment and Kant 
as an apology: “It is, in the classical sense, a succinct statement and defense of his own 
critical project. It is also an apologia in the sense that Foucault seeks to answer (at least 
obliquely) the objections of many of his critics.”   
11 Human Nature: Justice versus Power Noam Chomsky debates with Michel Foucault, 1971 
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rhetoric.”12 Therefore, this late self-affiliation with Kant demonstrates a symptom of 
incoherency, a need for normative justification for Habermas. 
 
In his eulogy for Michel Foucault, Habermas reveals his bewilderment following 
Foucault’s “curious declaration of loyalties”, and asks: 
 
“How does such a singularly affirmative understanding of modern philosophizing, 
always directed to our own actuality and imprinted in the here-and-now, fit with 
Foucault's unyielding criticism of modernity? How can Foucault's self-understanding 
as a thinker in the tradition of the Enlightenment be compatible with his unmistakable 
criticism of this very form of knowledge of modernity?”13 
 
Failing to find any reasonable explanation other than the assumption that Foucault 
indeed came to recognize the major contradiction in his philosophy towards the end of his 
life, Habermas concludes: 
 
“He contrasts his critique of power with the "analysis of truth" in such a fashion that 
the former becomes deprived of the normative yardsticks that it would have to borrow 
from the latter. Perhaps the force of this contradiction caught up with Foucault in this 
last of his texts, drawing him again into the circle of the philosophical discourse of 
modernity which he thought he could explode.”14 
 
Among several others, Habermas too, suggests the idea that Foucault seems to have 
two radically different Kants: one that Foucault rejects (Kant of the Critiques) and one that he 
embraces (Kant of “What is Enlightenment?” and Kant that Foucault refers to in other articles 
such as “What is Critique?”, and “What our Present Is”):      
  
“In Foucault’s lecture, we do not meet the Kant familiar from The Order of Things, the 
epistemologist who thrust open the door to the age of anthropological thought and the 
human sciences with his analysis of finiteness. Instead we encounter a different Kant – 
the precursor of the Young Hegelians, the Kant who was the first to make a serious 
                                                 
12 Habermas, J. (1987), p. 294 
13 Habermas, J. “Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present”, in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. 
David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1986), p.106 
14 Ibid. 108 
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break with the metaphysical heritage, who turned philosophy away from the Eternal 
Verities and concentrated on what philosophers had until then considered to be 
without concept and nonexistent, merely contingent and transitory.”15 
 
It is important to note, however, that although Foucault himself -particularly, in his 
essay entitled “The Art of Telling the Truth (On Parrhesia)”- makes such a distinction within 
the Kantian philosophy, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this work, he also adds that 
there is an intimate connection between Kant’s two legacies –the ontology of the present and 
the analytics of truth-, contrary to Habermas who argues that Foucault cannot have it both 
ways. It is one of the arguments of this work to reveal the importance of the connection 
between these two poles in the shaping of Foucault’s critical philosophy, and more 
importantly to put forward that Foucault’s genuine struggle with, and ultimately his rejection 
of Kant’s “analytics of truth” via his reading of the Critique and the Anthropology gives the 
final shape to his methodology (first, Kantian Archaeology, and later, Nietzschean 
Genealogy), while Kant’s “ontology of our present” provides Foucault the aim of his critical 
philosophy.     
 
Surely, Jürgen Habermas is not alone in his criticisms; Nancy Fraser joins him with a 
similar claim: “if one considers the disciplinary, or carceral, society described in Discipline 
and Punish [and asks] what exactly is wrong with that society, Kantian notions leap 
immediately to mind.”16 Since Foucault cannot account for any normative ground in which 
his philosophizing would justify any dissenting action for certain “modes of subjectivation 
and objectivation” that are deemed problematic in our modern society, Fraser argues that 
Michel Foucault seems to be “presupposing the very liberal norms that he criticizes”17, 
therefore, trapping himself within a major contradiction.      
 
Schmidt and Wartenberg, in “Foucault’s Enlightenment” -only to propose the opposite 
idea, that the struggle with Kant spanned Foucault’s career from start to end, thus it was most 
certainly not a strategic last minute move-, continue to fire away, summing up the arguments 
and reactions of those who think that Foucault was either deliberately provocative just to 
                                                 
15 Habermas, J. “Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present,” in Kelly, ed., Critique and Power, 
150. 
16 Fraser, N. (1989), p. 30, retrieved from Christina Hendricks, “Foucault’s Kantian Critique: 
Philosophy and the Present” in Philosophy Social Criticism, 2008, 34: 357 
17 Ibid. 
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“parry the thrusts” of his critics or insincere at best in this last moment of repentance, about 
his sudden attachment to Kant: “How could a thinker who had spend his life showing how the 
light of reason forges subtle but powerful bonds choose –at the very end- to cast his lot with 
the tradition he had mercilessly criticized? Was this one last quick change of masks by a 
master of ironic gesture? Or had he come at last to question the coherence of his earlier work? 
He had spoken with contempt of “the blackmail of the Enlightenment” – the “simplistic and 
authoritarian alternative” that “either you accept the Enlightenment and remain within the 
tradition of its rationalism…or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape 
from its principles of rationality.”18 But even as he was mocking the blackmailer, was his 
check, Schmidt and Wartenberg asked, already in the mail?19      
 
In the next section, I will introduce the arguments of those scholars whose answer, in 
essence, is “No” to this question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Foucault, M. (1984), ”What is Enlightenment?”, section quoted from Schmidt and 
Wartenberg, (1994), p. 284 
19 Ibid. 
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A-2 
A Sincere Struggle with Kant: An “Immanent Critique”/ 
“Continuation-Through-Transformation” Thesis 
 
In response to Habermas, Schmidt and Wartenberg warn us not to rush into too hasty 
repudiations concerning Foucault’s self-professed philosophical alliance with Kant and the 
Enlightenment tradition. They argue that, Foucault’s “invocation of Kant should neither be 
written off as simply an ironic gesture nor turned into a deathbed concession of defeat. It is 
instead a remarkably productive interrogation of a thinker who never ceased to inspire and 
provoke Foucault.”20 Although, Schmidt and Wartenberg realize the centrality of Kant within 
Foucault’s thought (as Amy Allen notes, when quoting from their piece, that Foucault’s 
Kantianism was definitely not a “passing fancy”), and despite their detailed focusing on a 
variety of Foucault’s late works revolving around the issues of Kantian philosophy and the 
Enlightenment spirit, while presenting Foucault’s distinctively close reading of Kant’s several 
other works (small essays, prize winning articles, mostly presented to the Berlinische 
Monatschrift, other than his celebrated “An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?”), they still submit to the idea that Foucault indeed maintains two separate 
Kants, therefore, at least at this point, they seem to be in agreement with Jürgen Habermas. 
 
Although Thomas McCarthy had used the phrase when describing Habermas’ 
philosophy, Amy Allen borrows it to describe Foucault’s, indicating that he, “like Habermas, 
offers us a continuation-through-transformation of the Kantian critical project.”21 Amy Allen 
is one of the first scholars who took Foucault’s Commentary to Kant’s Anthropology (entitled 
Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology) seriously22 and offered a close reading of this text with 
another of Foucault’s early work, The Order of Things. Consequently, after analyzing 
Foucault’s early close encounters with Kant, the epistemologist (as opposed to popularized 
                                                 
20 Schmidt and Wartenberg, 1994, p. 287 
21 Allen, A. (2003) p. 183 
22Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology was commonly considered as a “crackpot or 
marginal” approach to Kant’s central philosophical enterprise. Today, both works (Foucault’s 
Commentary and Kant’s Anthropology) are regarded as seminal and scholarly reflections 
upon these works increased immensely in the last few years. See Olssen (2006) for a long list 
of recent literature that provides an analysis of the Commentary.  See Miller, 1993 for an 
analysis of this long and ambiguous silence concerning both of these works. 
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Kant of the “What is Enlightenment”, that is Kant, the critical philosopher of the present) she 
is able to put forward that “Foucault’s stance toward Kant was never as rejectionist as has 
been supposed”. For Allen, Foucault is engaging in a kind of ‘immanent critique’, or a 
“Kantian critique of Kantian critique”, attempting to transform the critical philosophy from 
within, and investigating the limits and the conditions of possibility of the transcendental 
subject.  
 
For Daniel Touey both Foucault and Kant were concerned with a similar question: 
“How is it possible that I know the things that I know, and what accounts for the way I know 
them.”23 Considering Foucault’s emphasis on the importance of the analysis of human 
“practice”, and from the Anthropology, we also know that Kant was also concerned to test, so 
to speak, his assumptions in the Critique, this time within the empirical realm in human 
experience24; we would not be doing any harm to that fundamental question presented above, 
the one that Kant and Foucault both share, if we replaced the verb “know”, with “do” in the 
quote above taken from Touey.      
 
A common mistake, shared by most of the commentators to this debate and 
particularly of those that were mentioned in the first section, displaying an all too rejectionist 
of a reading of Foucault’s Kantian aspirations is that they seem to focus on a limited number 
of Foucault’s texts: even those who make references to The Order of Things seem to either 
misunderstand or simply overlook the sections where Foucault deals with Kant and explains 
his reasons behind his rejection of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical anthropology. It is 
one of the arguments of this work to put forward the idea that, charges against Foucault’s self-
proclaimed Kantianism (charges of contradiction, apologia, etc.) can best be answered by a 
careful examination and a reconsideration of Foucault’s early works on Kant, so that one can 
demonstrate that Foucault’s stance toward Kant had never been entirely rejectionist as has 
been proposed and supposed. Amy Allen notes, after an analysis of Foucault’s Commentary, 
that it is remarkable to see “a striking continuity…, namely, a central and abiding interest in 
                                                 
23 Touey, D. (1998) p. 98 
24 Kant’s analyses on the faculty of desire –third book, in the Anthropology-, or the second 
part of the Anthropology, entitled Anthropological Characterization, where Kant analyzes the 
character of “person, sexes, nation, races and species” respectively, are segments of the 
Anthropology where Kant dwells upon the empirical contents of the transcendental 
conditions. 
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and critical engagement with philosophical anthropology.”25 After reviewing the 
Commentary, it becomes obvious that Kant’s Anthropology is not a marginal text only to be 
discarded when famous Critiques are on the table; for Foucault, as the last published text of 
Kant, as the book on his most popular class which he had lectured for over thirty years, and 
accordingly continued to update, labor on and improve with new material, Anthropology is as 
central as it can be for Kant’s critical philosophy: it is the text, which, not only, establishes the 
question “Was ist der Mensch?” as the central question of future philosophies, and therefore 
re-centers Kant’s own triple interrogation onto this fourth question (this displacement is 
highly problematic, as will be seen later, as it causes to make the contents of empirical 
experience work as their own conditions of possibility, eventually resulting in a confusion 
between the empirical and the a priori), but this text, by establishing ‘man’ as the central 
concern of philosophy thus monopolizing the field of possible knowledge around him26, 
thereby bestowing post-Kantian philosophers with that insidious circularity - a constant back 
and forth between ‘man’ and his doubles- of which our modern philosophy is condemned. 
Therefore, Foucault’s philosophy is not a rejection of humanism for rejection’s sake; it is 
rather the recognition of a major problem within Western modern philosophy. 
 
What Foucault realizes in his reading of the Kant of the Critique and Kant of the 
Anthropology is the changing form of the role attributed to the transcendental subject 
(particularly in the latter); and it is from this moment onwards, Foucault puts forward the idea 
that the transcendental theme, first introduced by Kant, becomes problematic when analyzed 
within actual experiences, cultural and social structures, and thus he concludes that, the 
modern subject (both as subject and object) is grounded in contingent historical conditions, 
which he never can fully understand and thus can never master. In the end, therefore, while 
Kant is interested in what is necessary and universal in what seems to be contingent, 
Foucault, by reversing the plot, but while still remaining faithful to the critical 
enterprise by remaining within the same ground in which the subject is analyzed, 
questions what is contingent in what seems to be necessary and universal. A close 
examination of Foucault’s Commentary in the following sections, will give us the main 
trajectory in which Foucault conducts his critical project: an attempt “to historicize as much 
                                                 
25 Allen, A. p. 182 
26 "Man, as anthropology constitutes [...] the fundamental disposition that has governed and 
controlled the path of philosophical thought since Kant until our own day". “The Order of 
Things” (henceforth OT in the endnotes and references), p. 342 
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as possible in order to leave as little space as possible to the transcendental”27and rethink it in 
a non-subjective way.28 Although, in the same interview that which the previous quote is 
taken, Foucault himself admits that he cannot rule out the possibility that one day he will have 
to “confront an irreducible residuum which will be, in fact, the transcendental.” 
 
Therefore, Touey is correct in suggesting that Foucault is involved in a Kantian 
critique without Kantian foundations. For Foucault, the conditions under which our a priori 
grounds are formed are “specific to the historical situations”, in which a framework of 
“relative stabilities” are continually “shifting”.29 Since the gaze of the critical philosopher 
turns outside the subject, to the place where the “place of the king”30 - within which 
knowledge and truth should be formed under already determined (transcendental) conditions- 
is ignored for a moment, so that what seems to be transcendental conditionings will have a 
chance to be tested, for there is a probability that they may be momentary, arbitrary 
occurrences within the field of representations, or they might simply belong to the domain of 
epistemology rather than ontology, and perhaps the place reserved for this enslaved sovereign 
is never the conditioning subject of Kant, but that most peculiar but clever animal of 
Nietzsche who on an obscure planet, one day, invented something called ‘knowledge’.31  
 
Although in the Order of Things we do witness an entirely different approach to Kant, 
it is also true that the nature of the charges in this book against Kant is not quite clear. It is 
                                                 
27 Interview with Michel Foucault, entitled “A Historian of Culture” in Foucault Live, Michel 
Foucault: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984, ed. by Sylvére Lotringer, 1989, Semiotext(e) 
28 The final chapter of The Archaeology of Knowledge is framed as a dialogue between 
Foucault and a hypothetical critic. In the dialogue Foucault responds to the questions 
concerning his methods and project overall with the questions he himself prepared. In one of 
them he asks: "you have fantasized a discourse that does not depend on speaking subjects; 
therefore, you do not take account of the full range of richness and irregularity in discourse.” 
He replies as "I did not erase the speaking subject, but rather approached the issue at the level 
of discourse, describing the diversity of positions from which the subject can speak." 
29 Touey, D. (1998), p. 96 
30 The place that could not be represented in Las Meninas, as described by Foucault in the 
first chapter of The Order of Things, since the classical épistéme, which “representation” was 
the epistemic structure, could not represent “representation” itself. The Classical épistéme 
ended with Kant, by the famous Copernican revolution, when Kant opened that space 
whereby the knowing subject ended up “defining by its very interrogation the field in which 
its answer will be given, thus revealing himself to be the “condition of possibility of 
experience itself” (OT, 244) citation modified, and partially excerpted from Beatrice Han-
Pile, (1998), p. 18 
31 Nietzsche, F. “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, 1873 
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one of the arguments of this work that, particularly with the help of Foucault’s reading of 
Kant’s Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point of View and his introductory notes that made 
up his thèse complémentaire (Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology), his philosophical attitude 
toward Kant had been “a good deal more nuanced and complex than his critics would lead us 
to believe.”32 I shall come back to this issue in the following chapters. First, however, I wish 
to present several reasons myself, realizing that these reasons in line to explain why 
Foucault’s supposed “late return” is neither contradictory, nor can it best be characterized as a 
“return”, have been largely missing in the scholarship defending Foucault against Habermas’ 
claims.   
First, and foremost, Foucault cannot deny Kantian tradition in its entirety33, for the 
reasons that, as Foucault explains in The Order of Things, “[T]he Kantian critique marks the 
threshold of our Modernity”34, therefore, the épistéme of our time begins with the 
“Copernican” revolution, when the conditions of the constitution and legitimacy of all 
possible knowledge were referred to the transcendental subject in its capacity as “the 
foundation of a possible synthesis of all representations.” Therefore, as a “son of his time”35, 
Foucault cannot escape from the very épistéme that he is thinking within (“the thought that is 
contemporaneous with us, and with which, willy-nilly, we think”36). One cannot renounce the 
conditions in which one thinks without risking the possibility to relapse towards the 
unintelligible. Épistéme, as historical a priori, defines the limits of historically determined 
conditions of possibility for a thinking subject to appear, therefore, the very limits that 
conditions the way the thinking subject organizes his thoughts, enable him to make (true or 
false) judgments, thus remain within the “intelligible”.  This is the reason, why he proclaims 
in 1966: “We are all Neo-Kantians,” while reminding “the ceaselessly repeated injunction to 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 303 
33 Particularly, the analytic of finitude and ‘man’ as “a strange empirico-transcendental 
doublet” (for Foucault, these themes form the epistemic structure of our time), which gained 
its shape after the three questions of the Critique were ultimately referred to that of “Was ist 
der Mensch?”, thereby Western philosophy found itself enwrapped around the central theme 
of ‘man’, which, in this manner, determined the epistemic structure of our time by 
centralizing the human subject in the modern episteme by making him both, the foundation of 
all knowledge and its object, where that knowledge becomes meaningful. 
34 Foucault, M., OT, p. 242 
35 Hegel, Lessons on the History of Philosophy 
36 Foucault, M., OT, p. 250  
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return to the break established by Kant- both to discover its necessity and to understand its 
consequences more fully.”37  
 
Secondly, and particularly in light of the recent translation and publication of one of 
Foucault’s oldest works, his second doctoral thesis “Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology”, 
which remained under dark for a long time in the archives of Bibliothequé de la Sorbonne, 
University of Paris; we are now in a better position to understand his philosophical 
relationship with Kant, and perhaps, understand, now more fully, the ambivalent character of 
Kant in Foucault’s The Order of Things, or grasp what was the reason for Foucault to reject –
to some degree- the answers given by, “Kant the epistemologist”, while embracing Kant, “the 
thinker of his own present”. Although, I shall again postpone the introduction of Foucault’s 
Commentary for now, only to present a more direct line that could connect the philosophy of 
Kant to that of Foucault. In the next section, I will try to find “the question” that Foucault 
himself admits that his philosophy had continued to come back and referred itself to, and, in 
fact, I will try to demonstrate with examples from a variety of his works that it had indeed 
been the “guiding” question that shaped his philosophy from its core, and I will present the 
Kantian origins of this fundamental question, namely: “the question of the conditions of 
possibility of knowledge.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Dits et Ecrits, Vol. 1, p. 546, quote retrieved from B. Han-Pile, “Foucault’s Critical Project: 
Between the Transcendental and the Historical” (henceforth FCP), p. 3  
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CHAPTER II 
B-1 
“The Conditions of the Possibility of Knowledge” 
 
 Having briefly touched upon the debates concerning Foucault’s announcement about 
him being a follower of the Kantian tradition, it is now imperative, in order to determine the 
nature of the philosophical relationship between Kant and Foucault, first, to assess the nature 
of the impacts of Kantian transcendental philosophy on Foucault, and second, by an analysis 
of Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, to locate the points of convergence and divergence in 
the thoughts of both philosophers.  
 
In this section, I will raise the question of whether one can argue that within the 
Foucauldian project, there is a single coherent focus, that is, if one considers the Foucauldian 
corpus in its most abstract general form, whether one can find a unity among his works, a 
concern that had not changed although the methodology used in chasing that concern had 
changed its form several times. In doing this, my aim is not to put forward the idea that 
without such a coherency the Foucauldian enterprise would be in vain, nor this question is 
utilized here so that indeed one can successfully “reduce” his entire philosophy to one (and 
only one) question; it is rather to demonstrate that one can indeed achieve such a unity of 
thought in the Foucauldian corpus, and second, it is possible to demonstrate that this central 
theme is a result of a genuine struggle with Kant. After establishing a secure ground whereby 
the Foucauldian project is situated on one of its core levels, I will question the affinity 
between this project and that of Kant’s, and ask whether Foucault should be considered as a 
member of the Kantian lineage, before his late essays on the Enlightenment and on Kant, as 
the thinker of his own present.     
     
 Second, I will assess the focus of Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, for 
as early as 1961, and before The Order of Things, where Foucault accuses Kant for lulling 
modern thought into an “anthropological sleep”. In the Introduction (henceforth referred as 
the Commentary), we can trace the earlier manifestations of the problems that Foucault claims 
inherent in Kant’s philosophy. As Hacking points out, The Order of Things can be considered 
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as a continuation of Foucault’s Introduction38 and it is the book where Foucault most 
explicitly and systematically problematizes Kant.39    
 
I. 
 
From Birth of the Clinic (1963) to the third volume of History of Sexuality (1984) 
there are two major reformations in Michel Foucault’s oeuvre in which he either abandoned 
his former methodology completely or reassessed and reexamined the way he carried out his 
research: genealogy followed archeology, and following the first volume of the History of 
Sexuality (with The Use of Pleasure) Foucault started his project of “History of Subjectivity” 
(‘techniques of the self’), his final 5-volume project which he could not finish. In each of 
these investigative methods, Foucault focuses on different objects, - respectively: épistémes, 
“regimes of truth”, or “problematizations”.40 Not only these three periods problematizes 
different objects, Foucault goes back to Greek and Roman classics of Western philosophy in 
his final works, whereas his first two inquiries were largely concentrated upon a timeframe 
beginning with the end of the Renaissance and the end of the 19th century. Considering these 
vast methodological and temporal variations in his thought, is it possible to claim that there 
had been an unchanging motive, a project that was able to preserve its singularity in 
Foucault’s works? 
 
                                                 
38 Foucault never published his thèse complémentaire on Kant, instead his 128 pages long 
Commentary became a three-pages long historical preface to the early French translation of 
Kant’s Anthropology, which ended with this promissory note: “The relationship between 
critical thought and anthropological reflection will be studied in a later work.” That later work 
is The Order of Things. – From an Interview with M. Foucault, Dits et écrits (Paris: Vrin, 
1994), Vol. I:26   
39 Hacking, Ian in Couzens-Hoy (eds.) “Foucault: A Critical Reader” p. 32-33 
40 “Archaeological” Period: The Birth of the Clinic (1963), The Order of Things (1966), The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1969)- “Genealogical Period: The Order of Discourse (1970), 
Discipline and Punish (1975), Volume I of The History of Sexuality (1976)- The “History of 
Subjectivity”: The Use of Pleasure, vol. 2 of The History of Sexuality (1984), The Care of The 
Self, vol. 3 of The History of Sexuality (1984). 
Not every scholar, who is interested in Foucault’s works, share this opinion, that is, one can –
or shall- divide the Foucauldian oeuvre into  three distinctively separated periods. I submit to 
the view, however, which puts forward that, if a major change in methodology and a 
refocusing of the subject of analysis take place, the differentials have to be accounted for in 
their respective domains, which may now present, albeit not always in a clear cut manner, but 
still bearing visible marks that are indicative of a need for a “periodization”.     
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Several of Foucault’s interviews, lectures and the commentary of The Use of Pleasure 
are dedicated to prove that indeed, there is such continuity. Two lectures given at the Collége 
de France41 establish an immediate relationship between archaeology and genealogy, while 
the former is described as the method; the latter determines the aim of that method. According 
to Davidson this shift is not “a replacement of the archaeology by the genealogy” as some 
may suggest, but, rather, it is the integration of a "second axis" of analysis which brings the 
archaeology "in a wider framework"42. Similarly, Mahon argues that for Foucault the 
relationship between archaeology and genealogy is one that is between a method and its goal. 
Foucault himself describes this shift in the following way: "What I mean by archaeology is a 
methodological framework for my analysis. What I mean by genealogy is both the reason and 
the target of analyzing those discourses as events".43 Garry Gutting describes this “turn to 
genealogy”, which “adumbrated in [Foucault’s] inaugural lecture at the Collége de France, 
The Order of Discourse, and fully developed in Discipline and Punish”, as the one that which 
“goes beyond archaeology by reformulating the historical a priori in terms of non-discursive 
causal factors, in particular social power relations.44 According to Hoy, by the time Foucault 
writes Discipline and Punish, he has seen the error of his archaeological method, and his 
postmodern “pastiche emulates Nietzsche more than Kant”.45 Archaeology and genealogy are 
both attempts to make our modern unthought clearer (“to make the cultural unconscious 
apparent”), understandable, which, according to Hoy, is the task of both modern and 
postmodern thought. However, while archaeology; “with its pretensions to epistemology (in 
the traditional sense of the privileged discourse about the conditions for the possibility of any 
and every form of knowledge)”46 becomes stuck in the analysis of the unthought mainly in the 
discursive fields, genealogy recognizes analysis of the discursive field as only one form of 
many frameworks in which the conditions of the possibility of knowledge is enclosed and 
formed.   
                                                 
41 Lecture one, 7 January 1976 - Lecture two, 14 January 1976 in Colin Gordon eds. 
“Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977”, p. 79-108 
42 Davidson, A. I. “Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics” in D. C. Hoy (Ed.), Foucault: A Critical 
Reader, London: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 227 
43 Cited in Mahon, M. “Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject”. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992, p. 105 
44 Gutting, G. “Introduction: Michel Foucault: A User’s Manual”, Cambridge Companion to 
Foucault, p. 9 
45 Hoy, D. “Foucault: Modern or Postmodern?” in Jonathan Arac, ed., After Foucault: 
Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1988), 32  
46 Ibid. 
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In Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-84, Foucault 
himself summarizes the crux of his seemingly disperse explorations in the following way: 
“One might have changed point of view, one has gone round and round the problem, which is 
still the same, namely, the relations between the subject, truth and the constitution of 
experience” (p. 48) (citation modified).  
 
It is crucial to ask, after witnessing such an apparent disparity in Foucauldian 
methodology, subject matter and time horizon that how can Foucault claim that he had always 
concerned himself “with the same problem”? Particularly after taking into consideration his 
energetic dedication –starting with as early as the 1960s- to drive all forms of subjectivity (but 
most certainly not the forms of “subjectivation” and “objectivation”, which form the axis in 
which his critical philosophy is situated) out of the philosophical stage (e.g., The Death of the 
Author), on what grounds Foucault can justify his claim that his project had essentially been 
the study of “the relations between the subject, truth and the constitution of experience”?  
 
If we are to look for, within the Foucauldian project, a coherent set of questions for the 
purposes of excavating a core, a fundamental philosophical concern, only to test it against a 
Kantian background and to check for a similitude, we should also be able to systematically 
categorize the Foucauldian corpus around a central theme to which others could be 
subordinated. In a recent book, Béatrice Han argues that “this central theme is situated at the 
convergence of an initial question with an object that appears later, a convergence that occurs 
only retrospectively to Foucault himself, by means of a reflection on his own course and 
strategies.”47 This “initial question” is posed in differing manners and under diverse forms, 
but one of the most visible forms that this concern is vocalized in The Birth of the Clinic: 
 
“The research that I am undertaking here therefore involves a project that is 
deliberately both historical and critical, in that it is concerned…with determining 
the conditions of possibility of medical experience in Modern times…Here, as well 
as elsewhere, it is a study that sets out to uncover, from within the density of 
discourse, the conditions of its history.”48  
 
                                                 
47 Han, B. FCP, p.2 
48 Foucault, M. “The Birth of the Clinic”, xix 
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Following The Birth of the Clinic, in a similar vein, Foucault describes the 
“archaeological level” as that which “makes knowledge possible”49 in The Order of Things 
and depicts his project as the one that which reconstitutes “the general system of thought 
whose network, in its positivity, renders an interplay of simultaneous and apparently 
contradictory opinions possible. It is this network that defines the conditions of possibility 
of a controversy or of a problem, and that bears the historicity of knowledge.”50 In the same 
spirit, The Archaeology of Knowledge puts forward that it is “not a question of 
rediscovering what can legitimize an assertion, but of freeing the conditions of emergence 
of statements.”51 In Dits ets écrits, the focus of the text is put forward as the “general theme 
of the conditions of possibility of a science”, identification of “two heteromorphic 
systems”, one of which concerns “the conditions of science as science”, and the second 
questions “the possibility of a science in its historical existence”.52 
 
In The Order of Things, we witness a clearer expression of the aim of Foucauldian 
archaeology: “What I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the 
épistéme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its 
rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a 
history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of 
possibility.” (my italics)53    
 
Finally, in an interview, conducted in late 1960s, Foucault describes the domain of 
research that he ascribes to his archeology in the following way: “In a society, different 
bodies of learning, philosophical ideas, everyday opinions, but also institutions, 
commercial practices and political activities, mores- all refer to a certain implicit 
knowledge (savoir) special to this society. This knowledge is profoundly different from the 
bodies of learning that one can find in scientific books, philosophical theories, and religious 
justifications, but it is what makes possible at a given moment the appearance of a theory, 
an opinion, a practice... [.and] it is this knowledge that I wanted to investigate, as the 
condition of possibility of knowledge (connaissance), of institutions, of practices.” 54   
                                                 
49 Foucault, M., OT, p. 31 
50 Ibid. 75 
51 Foucault, M. “The Archaeology of Knowledge”, p. 127 
52 Foucault, M. “Dits ets écrits”, (Paris: Vrin, 1994), vol.1:724 
53 Foucault, M., OT, p. xxii 
54 Foucault Live, p. 13 
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Therefore, at least during the archaeological period, the central concern of Foucault 
is “the question of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge”. Taken this way, 
Foucault seems to be justified in his claims to follow the Kantian tradition, since Kant is 
considered to be among those philosophers in the Western tradition of philosophy, who 
questioned “the conditions of possibility of knowledge”. Through him, Foucault says, the 
“modern age” had begun: 
 
“Kant seems to me to have founded the two great critical traditions between 
which modern philosophy is divided. Let us say that in his great critical work 
Kant posed and laid the foundations for that tradition of philosophy that poses the 
question of the conditions in which true knowledge is possible and, on that basis, 
it may be said that a whole stretch of Modern philosophy from the nineteenth 
century has been presented, developed as the analytics of truth.”55  
 
Thus, Kant established the break in which Foucault’s work has to be situated. This 
break, Foucault says, entails “an analysis of the conditions under which certain relations 
of subject and object are formed or modified”, and a demonstration of how such 
conditions “are constitutive of a possible knowledge.”56 
 
 However, for Kant, it only became possible to answer to the question, that is, the 
question of possibility of true knowledge, with The Critique of Pure Reason, after he 
introduced the clear distinction between the empirical and the transcendental. It is at this 
point, we have to underline the reasons behind Foucault’s rejection of Kant’s answer: 
first, in his Commentary to Kant’s Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View, 
Foucault “by tracing …the genesis of the transcendental theme”, demonstrates that “there 
are within Kant’s own work two ambivalently related versions of this theme.”57 The clear 
distinction between the empirical field and the transcendental (a priori) conditions, 
established in the Critique, goes through a serious deflection in the Anthropology, a 
deviation of the a priori to the “originary”, when Kant’s famous tripartite questioning 
                                                 
55 Foucault, M. “Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984”, p. 
95 
56 Olssen, M. (2006) Citation taken from Miller, (1994), p. 138 
57 Han, B., FCP, p. 3 
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becomes restored to a new center, around the question “Was ist der Mensch?”58, whereby 
anthropological investigation is given a preeminent role within modern philosophy: an 
investigation into the nature of man with the task of uncovering fixed universals behind 
surface differences. However, this displacement, as Han suggests, is surreptitiously 
convoluted “as it tends to make the contents of the empirical experience work as their 
own conditions of possibility; moreover, it seeks within human finitude the elements of a 
transcendental determination henceforth made impossible in principle by the 
anthropological confusion between the empirical and the a priori.”59 Foucault’s second 
objection to the answer given by Kant is evidenced by his criticisms of post-Kantian 
theories (analyzed in the last three chapters of The Order of Things) “as being imprisoned 
by the “Analytic of Finitude”, itself a result of the monopolization of the field of possible 
knowledge by “man” and his doubles”60, that is, the modern mode of thought after Kant 
being enclosed within a vicious circle (referred above as the Analytic of Finitude) 
whereby the conditions of possibility of knowledge are assimilated into the same space 
within which they are meant to be found- an unfortunate move that destroys the very 
possibility of any foundation.             
 
 For Foucault, Kant not only established the limits that which reason cannot 
transgress, thus initiating the modern épistéme by heralding that “discursive space in 
which modernity deployed itself”, he also signaled its premature and abrupt end “by 
closing this opening when he ultimately relegated all critical investigations to an 
anthropological question”61, therefore, becoming its insuperable boundary: as a result, 
although Foucault himself embraces “the critical question” of Kant, “in the same 
movement, he shows the impossibility of answering it on Kantian grounds and with 
Kantian concepts.”62 Thus, the philosophy of Michel Foucault seems to be inspired by 
two opposing and contradictory problems arising from the ambivalence posed by Kant: to 
escape the “anthropologism”, which Kant’s philosophy either directly or reluctantly gave 
birth, while still remaining within the critical “opening” initiated by Kant. 
                                                 
58 This movement symbolizes the point when anthropology is given predominance amongst 
intellectual disciplines, by Kant. In The Order of Things, Foucault traced back the modern 
conception of man precisely to the moment when Kant established anthropology as the key 
area of philosophical enquiry.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Foucault, M. “A Preface to Transgression”, 1977, p. 38  
62 Han, B., FCP, p. 3 
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 It is at this moment Foucault takes refuge in a form of “historical 
transcendentalism” in reference to Hegel, whom he first studied under Jean Hyppolyte 
and wrote his D.E.A. manuscript (now lost) on: “La constitution d’un transcendental 
historique chez Hegel” (“The Constitution of the Historical Transcendental in Hegel”)63 
Hegel, similar to Foucault, was also after the historically contingent. However, although 
for Foucault, the immediate necessity to be aware of the historically contingent in our 
actualité is prerequisite and imperative for an ontological critique of ourselves; for Hegel, 
“the sole aim of philosophical inquiry is to eliminate the contingent” (Hegel 5, 28), 
because in the absence of the “divine goodwill”, and since “reason” and “nature” are now 
separated (after Kant), if we cannot get rid of contingency in nature, we should drive it 
out of our reason.  
 
 Foucault adopts “archaeology” as a method in reference to Kant64, a widely 
unknown but important detail about his philosophical and methodological allegiance to 
Kant and introduces the historical a priori65after his analysis of the ‘historical 
transcendental’ in the philosophy of Hegel. However, Foucauldian archaeology moves 
away from Kantian framework on two grounds: first is the anti-humanism of this method 
-reminiscent of Nietzsche and Heidegger-, hence Foucault’s repudiation of the 
transcendental subject as the starting point of his philosophy; and second, although the 
concept of the a priori is preserved, it is now purely historical in character. According to 
Béatrice Han,  
 
                                                 
63 Cited in Han, B. “Is Early Foucault A Historian? History, history and the Analytic of 
Finitude”, p. 6, fn. 
64 Foucault while explaining the Kantian origins of his archaeological method refers to this 
quote from Kant: “while [a priori] establishes the facts of reason, it does not lend them to the 
telling of a historical story, but draws them from the nature of human reason as a 
philosophical archaeology.” 
65 In the introduction to The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault defines the “historical a priori” as 
the “originary distribution of the visible and the invisible insofar as it is linked with the 
division between what can be stated and what remains unsaid.” (The Birth of the Clinic, p. 
xi)In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault puts forward another definition of what he 
means by the “historical a priori”: “Among the vast collection of possibilities offered by logic 
and grammar, the historical a priori has the function of circumscribing a more restricted 
domain by defining the conditions of possibility of statements in their character as ‘things 
actually said”. (The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 127)     
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“The notion of an “historical a priori” was first articulated in The Origins of 
Geometry; however, the underlying debate with Husserl established by The 
Archaeology of Knowledge is concerned precisely with the way in which this 
historicality should be defined. For Husserl, the historical a priori turns out to be 
“suprahistorical”, in the sense that it exists essentially to guarantee the possibility 
of recovering, beyond the sedimentations of history and tradition, the primary 
evidences originally thematized by the “protofounder” of geometry.”66                       
 
In light of this definition of Husserl’s “suprahistorical” a priori and Kantian 
“ahistorical” a priori; Foucauldian “historical a priori”, as defined in both The Order of 
Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, seems to occupy a middle ground, yet with a 
sui generis twist: although it is open to transformation with the “flow” of history, 
changing its form between eras, and although this transformation can be scrutinized 
because “historical a priori” is fully given in history; yet it is at the same time behind the 
curtains, defining “the conditions of possibility, themselves variable, from which the 
knowledge of an epoch can and must form itself.”67 The paradoxical impasse of the 
Kantian transcendental theme, exemplified by the ambivalence between its different 
versions in the Critique and the Anthropology (this ambivalence will be analyzed in the 
third chapter), forces Foucault to venture into a transposition of the transcendental with 
the historical, while rejecting the validity of a similar attempt by Husserl for its 
“suprahistorical” character. As a result, although French epistemologists, such as Merleu-
Ponty or Blanchot on the one hand, and on the other, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the 
Annales school68 had been detrimental in giving a final shape to Foucauldian critical 
philosophy; as evidenced by his sincere struggle to find a solution to the “Kantian 
problem”, while rejecting the grounds in which the critical question is asked, and 
deeming it irresolvable on Kantian grounds with Kantian concepts, but remaining still 
within the same critical effort, Foucault organizes his philosophical enterprise 
fundamentally with respect to Kant, meticulously avoiding his foundational 
transcendentalism with an attempt “to throw off the last anthropological constraints.”69 
Foucauldian project, overall, is not just an attempt to provide an account for the 
                                                 
66 Han, B., FCP, p. 4 
67 Ibid. 
68 Foucault, M. “Dits et Écrits”, vol. 3 p.580 
69 Foucault, M. “The Archaeology of Knowledge”, p. 15  
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contingent conditions under which certain human sciences had flourished, or an analysis 
of certain modes of objectivation and subjectivation in general; “but above all of the 
possibility of defining a new way of connecting history to philosophy, a middle path 
between an idealism he judged excessive –that of Kant and the post-Kantians- and the too 
reductive materialism of the thinkers lumped together by Foucault under the rubric 
“Marxists”.70      
 
In sum, Foucault’s refusal of the Kantian transcendental theme –the critique of the 
transcendental theme itself- proves central, in that, it incorporates within itself, the 
denunciation of the anthropological aporia71 that according to Foucault forces Western 
modern philosophy into a cul-de-sac, and second, through the introduction of the 
historical a priori a renewed project shows itself, in an effort to replace Kant’s famous 
answer in The Critique of Pure Reason, still in search of the conditions of the possibility 
of knowledge. For Foucault, this had also been the philosophical aim of Edmund Husserl 
and his “phenomenology” (i.e., Cartesian Meditations), which tried to find an alternative 
to Kantian pure transcendentalism, however, Foucault criticizes Husserl’s efforts for 
similar reasons he criticized Kant’s Anthropology: the paradoxical movement of the 
“originary” replaces the attempts to overcome pure transcendentalism. Although, this 
theme will be analyzed in the next section, the function of the “originary” is “to express 
within the paradoxical form of retrospection the movement by which the transcendental 
appear within the empirical as an “already there”, always present but perpetually elusive 
in its foundation.”72  
 
This paradoxical movement is typical of that vicious circle that ensnared our 
contemporary thought (“Analytic of Finitude”): we have to look for the founding in what 
is founded, the conditions of possibility are incorporated into which they are supposed to 
                                                 
70 Han, B., FCP, p. 5, see also Beatrice Han-Pile, “Is Early Foucault A Historian? History, 
history and the Analytic of Finitude”, 2005 
71“Anthropological constraints”, or “anthropological illusion”, all refer to that modern 
philosophical chimera, which implies the idea that anthropology is somehow liberated from 
“the prejudices and inert weights of the a priori”. Foucault, M. “Introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology”, p. 123. Most obvious illusion of this type can be seen in the complete 
renunciation of the transcendental theme (bypassing the very idea of transcendental 
determination) and a supreme trust in the empirical positivities by the “Marxists” and the 
“positivists”.  
72 Ibid. 
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be found, and therefore, any hope, every possibility for a founding is lost from the 
beginning by virtue of this paradoxical move. This is exactly the reason why Foucault 
chose to (or perhaps had to) cast aside the subject in his studies (at least, until the second 
volume of the History of Sexuality), or any philosophical foundation of ‘man’, such as the 
transcendental ego of Husserl: “in order to cast a non-originary version of the historical a 
priori- that is, to look for a transcendental without a subject.”73     
 
In the next section, I will analyze the Kantian threshold of our modernity as 
described by Foucault in The Order of Things (1966), and immediately afterwards, I will 
present the ambivalence of the way Kantian philosophy is presented in this book. At the 
end of the section, I will introduce the hypothesis that, in order for us to understand this 
ambivalence, and finally to be in a better position to pass a judgment about Foucault’s 
philosophical relationship with Kant; a close reading of Foucault’s thèse complémentaire 
(Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology) (1961) might prove central and this curiously 
provocative text can shed some light to the ambiguous position of Kant in Foucault’s The 
Order of Things. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
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B-2 From Classical Representation to Kant 
 
 The Order of Things hit the French book-shelves in 1966, became an instant best-
seller, exactly at the time when mass systematized advertisements were being formed for the 
first time by an immense synergy of newspapers, magazines, radio and TV networks, trying to 
reap the benefits of the popularized intellectual fields in the finally recovering post-war 
France. To the extent that and as much as Sartre and his followers hated and condemned74 the 
book, the more popular it became; the more one claimed to be an anarchist, a Marxist, a 
structuralist, and so on, and the more one felt the obligation to show his immediate entourage 
that he is reading Foucault’s The Order of Things. The book became an instant fad, but the 
feverish discussions had to wait, when most of the readers had read the book till the end, and 
saw the prophetic announcement of the “death (end) of ‘man’”: man, being a recent invention 
of our Modern thought, promised to an imminent death, and threatened with erasure like a 
“face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea”.75  
 
This declaration about the end of the modern epistemic structure, (which took its shape 
around a philosophico-anthropological understanding of man and his being –after Kant- and, 
of which the ‘analytic of finitude’ determined the ground in which human sciences, within 
this particular épistéme, found themselves constantly referred back to an interminable 
oscillation between the empirical and the transcendental, between the Other and the Same, the 
thought and the unthought) soon, although by not Foucault himself, but by his immediate 
followers, connected the book and therefore Foucault, with the wave of French anti-
humanism and sctructuralism of his time.  
 
Anti-humanism, as that great, but short-lived intellectual fire that burned Germany 
(first initiated by Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, denouncing the essence of man as 
presupposed by humanism as metaphysical), spread to France, and Sartre’s humanist 
existentialism (Existentialism is a Humanism), which grew stoutly popular by that time, 
thanks to overwhelming enthusiasm that arose with the end of the Second World War, was 
now in danger. In France, the debates surrounding anti-humanism were closely associated 
with a small but powerful group of intellectuals, such as Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Althusser, the 
                                                 
74 Sartre accused structuralists for constituting a new ideology, which he refers to as “the last 
barrier the bourgeoisie can still erect against Marx.”, quoted in Foucault Live, p. 54  
75 Foucault, M., OT, p. 387 
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linguists (following Ferdinand de Saussure), and Foucault, himself. At first, the subtitle of his 
book (The Order of Things) was not “An Archeology of Human Sciences”; it was “The 
Archaeology of Structuralism”. This book, according to Dreyfus and Rabinow, “is precisely 
an attempt to further these structuralist disciplines by determining ‘the possibilities and rights, 
the conditions and limitations, of a justified formalization’”.76  
 
Foucault believed, for some time, and although later on he emphatically denounced 
having any relation with structuralism whatsoever, at least when he was writing The Order of 
Things, that structuralism is the most suitable system of thought that can cope with the 
analytic of finitude, which seemed to haunt all the human sciences after Kant, thus 
structuralism seemed to be a breakthrough for Foucault in the de-anthropologization/de-
anthropomorphization of philosophy and human sciences. Structuralism, for Foucault, in its 
refusal to take man as the subject of freedom, while analyzing him as an object of knowledge 
may have a chance to escape the pitfalls where most post-Kantians, such as Marx, Comte, or 
Husserl and Sartre had failed to overcome. In the field of anti-humanism, there were others, 
literary theorists such as Maurice Blanchot, or historians from the Annales School, like 
Ferdinand Braudel; and although their assumptions and conclusions varied, and although they 
come from different disciplines, these thinkers fundamentally denied the primacy of man, be 
it as an epistemological starting point (the subject as the foundation of all possible knowledge, 
as in Husserlian phenomenology) or as a practical agent (freedom as the main operator and 
focus of historical development as in Hegelian history).77 They all underlined the crucial role 
played by unconscious structures that determine our thoughts and behaviors.   
 
The appeal of this relatively new formation in modern thought attracted Foucault 
because it too rejected the Subject in capital letters, the subject as origin and foundation of 
Knowledge (savoir), of Freedom, of Language, and History. Referring to this structuralist 
wave as a “rumbling”, Foucault says, in an interview:  
 
“One can say that all of Western civilization has been subjugated, and philosophers 
have only certified the fact by referring all thought and all truth to consciousness, to 
the Self, to the Subject. In the rumbling that shakes us today, perhaps we have to 
                                                 
76 Dreyfus and Rabinow, “Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics”, 2nd 
ed. p. 17 
77 Han-Pile, B. “The Death of Man: Foucault and Humanism”, p.2 
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recognize the birth of a world where the subject is not one but split, not sovereign but 
dependant, not an absolute origin but a function ceaselessly modified.” 78 (My italics) 
 
Returning back to his typical periodization from Madness and Civilization, Foucault 
analyzes, in The Order of Things, the épistémes of three historical periods: Renaissance, with 
its underlying epistemic structure based on ‘resemblance’, the Classical Age with 
‘representation’, and the Modern era with the “birth of ‘man’” as a result of the 
anthropological turn and the analytic of finitude (a distinction has to be made between “man”, 
as that empirical being, who lives, works, speaks and ‘man’ as the new historical a priori that 
underlies our comprehension of the former).  
 
In the book, Foucault attempts to analyze the structure of the discourses of varying 
disciplines of thought, i.e., life, labor and language. Such an analysis, for him, “does not 
belong to the history of ideas or of science: it is rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover 
on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge 
was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori …ideas could appear, sciences be 
established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to 
dissolve and vanish soon afterwards.”79 For that purpose, Foucault introduces his notion, 
épistéme, which later in The Archaeology of Knowledge, he defines as follows: 
 
“By épistéme, we mean…the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the 
discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences and possibly 
formalized systems…The épistéme is not a form of knowledge (connaissance) or type 
of rationality, which crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the 
sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can 
be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the 
level of discursive regularities.”80 
 
Foucault devotes much of the book to the analysis of Classical and Modern épistémes, 
so that he can provide the reader with the contrast material to show how much of a 
                                                 
78 In “Foucault Live, Michel Foucault: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984”, ed. by Sylvére 
Lotringer, p. 67 
79 Foucault, M., OT, xxi-xxii 
80 Foucault, M., “The Archaeology of Knowledge”, p. 191 
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radicalization that the Modernity brought with itself. This is not to say that the change in the 
epistemic systems between that of Renaissance and Classical age did not matter, but since 
Foucault’s guiding concern is to lay the groundwork for an analysis of the modern situation of 
the human sciences and show their incurable defect (the analytic of finitude), thus providing 
an opening for the coming of structuralism, his main areas of interest are the Classical and the 
Modern eras. According to Gary Gutting, the ultimate purpose of this book is “to understand 
the archaeological framework (épistéme) underlying the modern social sciences, but, since 
Foucault thinks this framework is dominated by the philosophical concept of 'man', 
particularly associated with Kant, his discussion includes a critical history of modern 
philosophy.”81  
 
Resemblance as the epistemic system of the Renaissance consists of four modes: 
convenience, in the simplest of terms it is the spatial proximity, which both relies upon and 
breeds resemblance; emulation is resemblance without the spatial proximity ("resemblance at 
a distance"); analogy is resemblance that stems from (any form of) relation; and finally, 
sympathy, resemblance that provokes, thus promotes spatial and qualitative change. In a 
world, where resemblance reigns as the supreme form of discursive regularity, signatures (or, 
signs if the signature is the being of a sign) are the channels in which representation flows, 
always in a hurry and since signs themselves are resemblances and since resemblance resides 
in both the mark and its content, they always carried the chance to become connected to 
something else in every turn of the tide, without an end, thus, for Foucault, 16th century’s 
knowledge "condemned itself to never knowing anything but the same thing, to knowing that 
thin only at the unattainable end of an endless journey."82  
 
Representation83 on the other hand, is the épistéme of the Classical Age, arising out of 
the rationalism of the 17th century, consistent with “the project of constructing a universal 
method of analysis which would yield perfect certainty by perfectly ordering representations 
and signs to mirror the ordering of the world, the order of being- for being, in the Classical 
                                                 
81 Gutting, G. “Foucault: A very Short Introduction”, p. 65 
82 Foucault, M., OT, p. 34 
83 George Berkeley (1685-1753) is a good example in the epitomization of this epistemic 
system: In his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), and again in 
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), the leading principle of Berkeley's 
philosophy was that the world as represented to our senses depends for its existence, as such, 
on being perceived (esse est percipi).  
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Age, had a universal order.”84. Thus, for Descartes and Leibniz (also for Hobbes) the nature is 
now renovated (as opposed to its Renaissance counterpart) into a totality of what can be 
“represented” and how can representation itself be conveyed by means of conventional signs. 
Foucault defines the Classical épistéme as the most general arrangement “in terms of the 
articulated system of a mathesis, a taxonomia and a genetic analysis. The sciences always 
carry within themselves the project, however remote it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of 
the world; they are always directed, too, towards the discovery of simple elements and their 
progressive combination; and at their center they form a table on which knowledge is 
displayed in a system.” Therefore, according to Foucault, the underlying structure, “the 
decisive paradigm” (in Kuhn’s terminology), for this is neither mathesis universalis 
(mathematization of the world) nor taxonomia (mechanistic understanding of the world) and 
genesis (the analysis of empirical orders), instead these are the results of the system 
understood as “ordered signs”- the order of things, or the order of being. It is the way that the 
universal order is represented that produces mathesis, taxonomia and genesis, not the other 
way around.  
 
Language, in this system, is fully transparent, in that the signs are fully representative 
of whatever is given to representation. As Habermas puts it, “the signifier fully retreats behind 
the indicated thing signified; it functions like a glass instrument for representation without 
having a life on its own.”85 It is in “the table” that such an ordering is possible, as Foucault 
himself describes:  
 
“The profound vocation of Classical language has always been to create a table- a 
‘picture’: whether it be in the form of natural discourse, the accumulation of truth, description 
of things, a body of exact knowledge, or an encyclopedic dictionary. It exists therefore, only 
to be transparent. … The possibility of knowing things and their order passes, in the Classical 
experience, through the sovereignty of words: words are, in fact, neither marks to be 
deciphered (as in the Renaissance period), nor more or less faithful and masterable 
instruments (as in the positivist period); they form rather a colorless network on the basis of 
which… representations are ordered.”86           
 
                                                 
84 Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 19 
85 Habermas, J. “Critique of Reason, Unmasking the Human Sciences”, p. 66 
86 Foucault, M., OT, p. 311 
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In Foucault’s view, the “emblematic figure” of this era is Descartes, who yearned for 
certainty through an investigation of a method that would provide it. For Descartes, the key 
structures for such a method were “comparison and order”. If, simple structures can be 
identified in any subject that is under scrutiny, and if these simples can be isolated accurately, 
then one can move from the simple to the complex with certainty and thus equipped with an 
intension to universalize through comparison. Therefore, as Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude, 
all questions of identity and difference can be reduced, in this way, through the use of method, 
to questions of order.87 This decidedly analytical move, ‘from the simplest to the most 
complex’, rested on the epistemic structure of “representation” with the intention to reach 
certitude through a method of standardized progression: “It is precisely in this that the method 
and its ‘progress’ consist: the reduction of all measurement (all determination by equality and 
inequality) to a serial arrangement which, beginning from the simplest, will show up all 
differences as degrees of complexity.”88      
 
 Thus, the Classical Age identified thought with representation, to think was to 
represent an object in a table of genus and species. In this form of “ordering”, the role of man 
is not one of “meaning creation”: the order is already there, all he can hope for is to come up 
with the most precise –albeit artificial, since the conventional signs are constructed- way with 
the representations he himself did not create- since man, himself, did not provide those 
conventional signs with meaning. Therefore, as Dreyfus and Rabinow point out, “man 
clarified, but did not create; he was not a transcendental source of signification”.89 This is 
what Foucault implies by saying that there was no theory of signification in the Classical Age. 
The critical moment of the book arises when Foucault follows with the assertion that 
“Classical language as the common discourse of representation and things, as the place within 
which nature and human nature intersect, absolutely excludes anything that could be a 
‘science of man.’ As long as that language was spoken in Western culture it was not possible 
for human existence to be called in question on its own account, since it contained the nexus 
of representation and being.”90  
 
                                                 
87 Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 19 
88 Foucault, M., OT, p. 54 
89 Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 19 
90 Foucault, M., OT, p. 311 
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This means that Classical thought cannot think of representation itself, in the Classical 
table, what we see is the profound invisibility of “representing”, itself as an activity. That is, 
the human activity of ordering things (man as positing subject and posited object), the very 
act of construction of the table itself cannot be represented91. Dreyfus and Rabinow explain 
the inability of the Classical Age to think of man, or to represent representation itself (as 
described in detail by Foucault in his surprising reading of Diego Velázquez de Silva's  Las 
Meninas92 as “the representation of, as it were, the Classical representation”) in the following 
way:  
 
“Since it was taken for granted that language by its very nature made possible 
successful representation, the role of human beings in relating representations and things 
could not itself be problematized…the activity of human beings in constructing the table 
could not itself be represented; there was no place for it on the table…Foucault is concerned 
exclusively with the systematization of the actual statements of an age, and he sees the 
Classical Age as having no place for man positing subject and posited object. Man cannot 
enter the classical picture without the whole scheme undergoing a radical transformation.” 
 
 This transformation comes with the Modern épistéme, when Kant posits man as the 
representing subject and represented object, or as Foucault puts it, that “strange empirico-
transcendental doublet”. In the next section I will analyze the ambiguous position that Kant 
occupies in The Order of Things, and propose at the end of the section, the necessity to read 
Foucault’s Commentary in order to better understand this ambivalent position of Kant.   
 
 
 
                                                 
91 “In Classical thought, the personage for whom the representation exists, and who represents 
himself within it, …he who ties together all the interlacing threads of the ‘representation in 
the form of a Picture or a table’ – he is never to be found in that table himself.” Ibid.308  
92 Las Meninas, for Foucault, demarcates the empty place of the “sovereign”, a place which 
will only be filled after Kant, and his introduction of the transcendental subject. The place of 
the king is what makes possible the representation, but it is at the same time elided. Hence, 
the central paradox of the Classical episteme lies in this impossibility of representing the act 
of representing: the possibility of representation depends on what itself cannot be represented, 
the transcendental subject. With the end of the Classical Age "man appears in his ambiguous 
position as an object of knowledge and a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed 
spectator, he appears in the place belonging to the king, which was assigned to him in 
advance by Las Meninas." 
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B-3 Kant, the Shiva 
 
According to Foucault, “the great turn” of modern philosophy takes place when, with 
Modernity, ideas are no longer taken to be transparent mediums of knowledge, when 
“representation” becomes obscure (the cogito is no longer transparent, the mind is not a sheet 
to be filled –a tabula rasa-) and thus, it becomes possible to ask the question whether ideas 
are –and to what degree- representative of their objects, and if they are, in virtue of what do 
they posses such capacity. It becomes possible to question the grounds in which 
representation itself is thought, thus, the fundamental question becomes, whether knowledge 
is rooted in something other than representation. It is still possible that some forms of 
knowledge, for all intents and purposes, derived from ideas representing objects, however, as 
Gutting declares, “Foucault insists, the thought that was only now [with Kant] possible was 
that representation itself [and the ideas that are represented] could have an origin in something 
else.”93 This is the transcendental subject.  
 
Kant opens the way to the idea that the mind itself is the ground in which 
representations are composed when he says, “We must, therefore, make trial whether we may 
not have more success … if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.” In the 
Renaissance and Classical épistémes ‘man’ was not a structuring principle for knowledge in 
the sense of being a condition of its possibility, with the modern épistéme ‘man’ emerges not 
only as the subject that knows but also the object of knowledge, an “organizer of the spectacle 
in which he [himself] appears.”94 This positioning of man, at the center of the spectacle in his 
dual role as the subject and the object of knowledge opens up several -and distinctively 
modern- possibilities in Western philosophy: first, already indicated by Kant, is the idea that 
representations are constituted by the human mind. Thoughts and ideas, first and foremost, are 
the products of our minds. It is important to realize the difference, however, that for Kant, 
these "products" of the mind are not that of natural or historical reality, they belong to a new 
epistemic structure- transcendental subjectivity. Therefore, one may put forward the idea that, 
there are within Kant's thought, still certain distinctively Classical themes about the way that 
knowledge is perceived, a sort of Classical conservatism, insisting that knowledge cannot be 
posited as a physical or a historical reality; for Kant the grounds of knowledge is situated in 
                                                 
93 Gutting, Gary, 1989, “Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason”, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
94 Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 29 
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the transcendental domain, within the constant, necessary and universal activity of our 
intuitions and categories, which are “more fundamental than the ideas [they] subtended."95 
Second view is the acknowledgement of ideas themselves as historical realities, an opening 
that was realized in several of post-Kantian philosophers. This path goes through several 
transformations in the history of Western thought, for instance, one branch posits knowledge 
being primarily tied to language (as in Herder’s thought): although, this line of thinking has 
its immediate background in the opening initiated by Kant; eventually, it carries with itself the 
danger of emptying knowledge of its normative validity. Heidegger says, this is also a point 
Kant himself had realized, and he asserts that, this possibility that resulted as a consequence 
of Kant’s critical interrogations drove the “possibility of metaphysics before the abyss. He 
saw the unknown; he had to draw back. Not only the imagination filled him with alarm, but in 
the meantime … he had also come more and more under the influence of ‘pure reason’ as 
such.”96 When knowledge is perceived as being primarily a mold (or a ‘fold’ as Deleuze 
would say) within the historical (or Historicized) succession of events, thus pushing slightly 
the debate upon that of the domain of the practical reason, the transcendental framework will 
carry the possibility to remain dangerously limited and reduced to a blunt framework for our 
thought, and pushed dangerously into a corner whereby it may face the possibility of losing 
entirely its normative validity.  
 
Consequently, with the first and second (paradoxical) openings mentioned in this 
chapter, both initiated almost single-handedly by Kant himself, Paul Tillich, a twentieth 
century theologian, has referred to Kant as the “Shiva figure” of the Enlightenment: Kant’s 
celebrated Critique of Pure Reason tended to undermine many of the Enlightenment ideals 
and its foundations, thus similar to Hindu god Shiva, he became the “creator and destroyer” of 
the very process that he situates himself and aligns his own thought. In the Hindu art and 
sculpture, Shiva (many armed one) with one legged raised is shown dancing, when one 
cosmic epic comes to an end and a new cosmic epic is created. And so it was with Kant and 
the Enlightenment, Tillich says, philosophy expressed some of its highest ideals; and yet by 
showing the limitations of human reason and science that same philosophy undercut the 
traditional foundations of Enlightenment faith. This is Kant the destroyer of the intellectual 
order. Like the Shiva figure he was, Kant also turned around and tried to reconstruct 
                                                 
95 Gutting, G. “Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason”, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989 
96 Heidegger, M. “Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics”, p. 173 
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Enlightenment ideals on a new basis.  He said in a famous quote, that he found it necessary to 
deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.97 Heinrich Heine, one of the most significant 
German romantic poets, said: "This little man from Königsberg aroused more terror in Europe 
than all the other minions of terrorists, like Robespierre or Marat, and all the political 
villains."  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Note the striking similarity between these two quotes both mentioned in this thesis: 
Foucault says he historicizes in order to leave as little room possible for the transcendental; 
Kant writes in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), “I have 
therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith."   
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B-4 “The Threshold of our Modernity” and the Ambivalence of Kant 
in The Order of Things 
 
In the closing chapters of The Order of Things Foucault dwells on Kant and Kantian 
philosophy, describing it as that caesura that marked the end of the age of representation. In 
his analysis, Kant’s critical thought “marked a shift from the horizontal interrogation of 
representation to the vertical questioning of its conditions of possibility, which were 
henceforth situated outside of representation and consequently escaped the epistemic horizon 
that the latter had previously assigned to thought.”98 
 
“The Kantian critique …marks the threshold of our Modernity; it questions 
representation … on the basis of its rightful limits. Thus it sanctions for the first time 
that event in European culture which coincides with the end of the 18th century: the 
withdrawal of knowledge [savoir] and thought outside the space of representation. 
That space is brought into question in its foundation, its origin, and its limits: and by 
this very fact, the unlimited field of representation, which Classical thought had 
established … now appears as metaphysics.”99 
 
Kant’s critical turn, however, presents itself as a paradoxical philosophical move, 
because the new épistéme of which Kant himself is the initiator, says Foucault in The Order 
of Things) is itself the space that is now supposed to provide all the answers, to the very 
questions which will be (and can only be) asked within it (from within). Since with Kant, a 
priori proofs are confined to the world of experience, and since Kant denies the Platonic 
‘essence’ (or the concept which testifies for the existence of an ‘intellectual intuition’)100 that 
for Plato everyone had and therefore also had natural access to the knowledge of the concepts 
such as God, immortality of the soul, etc.; after Kant, one can only ask questions for the sole 
purpose of seeking ‘knowledge’ about things one can, in principle, already experience.  
 
In Kant's last major work, the so-called Opus Postumum, a work Kant himself 
described as his "chef d'oeuvre" and as the keystone of his entire philosophical system, which 
                                                 
98 Han, B. FCP, p.17  
99 Foucault, M., OT, p. 242-243 
100 Similar references to that same Platonic ‘essence’ can also be seen in the philosophy of 
Aristotle, St. Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas.  
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occupied him for more than the last decade of his life, the central question for philosophy is 
laid forward as ‘Was ist der Mensch?’. Therefore, Kant assigns, for the purposes of his 
‘transcendental philosophy’, the central place to an analysis of man, in his unique (empirico-
transcendental) position. But, in the absence of the ‘intellectual intuition’ and since our reason 
is confined to the limits of experience, Foucault continues, the efforts that are made and that 
will be made in this épistéme, can only be an ‘Analytic of Finitude’. Because ‘man’ is limited 
in his transcendental and empirical conditions (empirical and transcendental finitude), the 
questions that he will ask (from the only place he can legitimately ask) can only be replied 
with yet another finding about man’s finitude.    
 
 
 Indeed, “at the end of the eighteenth century . . . seeing consists in leaving to 
experience its greatest corporal opacity; the solidity, the obscurity, the density of things closed 
in upon themselves, have powers of truth that they owe not to light”101; thus, in the modern 
épistéme, ‘man’s necessary and total involvement in the positivity of knowledge (i.e., 
empiricity) conceals the very objects that he seeks to know, without an external source of 
“light”, man is left alone in his  finitude: “All these contents that his knowledge reveals to him 
as exterior to himself, and older than his own birth, anticipate him, overhang him with all their 
solidity, and traverse him as though he were merely an object of nature … Man’s finitude is 
heralded –and imperiously so- in the positivity of knowledge.”102  
 
The most fundamental feature of the anthropological turn, therefore, for Foucault, is 
that human finitude (both empirical and transcendental finitude) becomes self-foundational; 
whereas for Descartes human finitude was put forward in an Aristotelian/Thomist view, far 
from being self-foundational, it was considered as a derivation of the infinite, viz. the only 
possible explanation for the notion of the infinite in man is the idea that it was placed there by 
God. 
 
   Let us follow our steps backwards a little bit, in order to grasp fully what is meant by 
Modern épistéme’s paradoxical movement. During the Classical period representation was 
both the ground and the privileged medium of knowledge: to be known was to be represented 
                                                 
101 Foucault, M., “The Birth of the Clinic”, xiii 
102 Foucault, M., OT, p. 313 
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adequately.103 On the other hand, beings were fully given to representation, at least in 
principle and the main objective of knowledge –where knowledge is directed in its essence- 
was to make perfect by finding the most suitable method that would compare, differentiate, 
measure and arrange representations (i.e., thoughts and ideas) so that the order of the world 
will be revealed. Foucault reads Descartes primarily on these grounds, viz. Descartes’ efforts 
in the organization of the system of thought that would systematize most effectively the 
differences between representations, or more generally, the fascination of the Classical age 
with the table “as a synoptic form of knowledge.”104 However, it is the modern age that 
prescribes the birth of ‘man’ (not in the ontological sense of the term, but epistemological) 
thanks to the well-known Copernican revolution, whereby the answer to the question of the 
conditions of the possibility of knowledge, by Kant, is located beyond the space of 
representation and these conditions themselves, therefore, are referred to the transcendental 
subject in its capacity as “the foundation of a possible synthesis of all representations”- a 
masterly show of skill from “the great Chinaman of Königsberg”105, in which the representing 
subject “ends up defining by its very interrogation the field in which its answer will be given, 
thus revealing itself to be the ‘condition of possibility of experience itself.”106  
 
As exemplified in the preceding paragraphs directly by a quote107 from Kant, the main 
idea behind the Copernican revolution was that it might be more profitable, in order to 
securely ground empirical knowledge –thus, provide a sufficient answer once and for all to 
                                                 
103 At this point, see: “the threshold between Classicism and modernity … had definitely 
crossed when words ceased to intersect with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid 
fort the knowledge of things.” (The Order of Things, p. 304) Language becomes a limiting 
structure imposed upon man (a founding finitude), “a dense web with its own inscrutable 
history”, as Dreyfus and Rabinow puts it.   
104 Han-Pile, B. “The Death of Man: Foucault and Humanism”, p. 7 
105 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil”, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random 
House, 1966), p. 210. Whoever uses Nietzsche’s now infamous referral to Kant, as that great 
Chinaman of Königsberg, is inclined to interpret this line as one of ridicule. However, who 
are those philosophers that Nietzsche most often attacks? He enumerates four principles in 
which his attacks are based in one his last books, "Why I am so Wise", Ecce Homo (page 7): 
(1) "I only attack causes that are victorious"; (2) "I stand alone"; (3) "I never attack persons"; 
and (4) "attack is in my case a proof of good will, sometimes even of gratitude." This referral 
of Nietzsche may not be that antagonistic as presupposed by many after all. For more, see 
“How Chinese" Was Kant?” by Stephen Palmquist. http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/ ~ppp/srp /arts/ 
HCWK.html #_ednref9   
106 Han, B. FCP, p. 18 
107 The quotation from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason referred above is on page 27: “We 
must, therefore, make trial whether we may not have more success … if we suppose that 
objects must conform to our knowledge.” 
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the interrogating gaze of the skeptic-, to look into the activity of representation (or activity of 
representing) itself, with a view to finding out whether any a priori conditions could be 
identified that would hold for any possible representational content. If such conditions are 
indeed there, then it would become possible to suggest that the mere existence of such 
necessary and universal restraints on our representations is enough proof to certify their 
legitimacy in the empirical realm.108 
 
This transition in the formal structure of the conditions of possibility of our knowledge 
from post hoc to a priori have two essential consequences: in the first step, the immediate 
result is that “the very being of what is represented fell outside of representation itself”109. 
Secondly, and this is the central theme of which this work will henceforth commit itself to 
disentangle via a close reading of Foucault’s Commentary; the Copernican revolution of Kant 
giving rise to a new understanding of man as “the empirico-transcendental double”. As a 
transcendental subject, ‘man’ is the foundation of empirical knowledge: “to be known is still 
to be represented; but in order to count as candidates for true knowledge, representation must 
conform to the epistemic conditions laid out in the Transcendental Aesthetic and 
Transcendental Analytic [in the Critique of Pure Reason].”110 Still, ‘man’ is at the same time 
a possible object of representation within the field opened up by such epistemic conditions. In 
Foucault’s words, “man appeared as an object of possible knowledge (…) and at the same 
time as the being through which all knowledge is possible.”111 It is important to emphasize 
however, at least at this point, the fact that these two aspects of man are clearly separated112 in 
the Critique, one does not cross over to the other’s domain, and it is this possibility of 
crossing over revealed in the Anthropology that will put the Kantian critique in jeopardy; 
when, as mentioned, Kant’s triple questioning (respectively followed in his Critiques) were 
re-centered around the fourth, that is, on the question of ‘man’, thus anticipating the 
philosophical path of modernity, while swirling it around a fundamentally anthropological 
understanding of man.  
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Analytic of finitude endangers this clear divide that the Critique established between 
the transcendental and the empirical (the two halves of the double), thus, gives the Copernican 
turn an anthropological twist. This twist, according to Foucault, was already apparent in 
Kant’s transition from The Critique of Pure Reason to Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point 
of View: “from Kant onwards … there is nothing but finitude, and it is in this sense that the 
Kantian critique carried with itself the possibility –or the peril- of anthropology.”113 This 
position of Foucault is not quite clear, what he means by “the peril of anthropology” cannot 
easily be deduced from the ambiguous chapters when he dwells extensively on Kant in the 
final chapters of The Order of Things. Let us now pass to these ambivalent remarks on 
Kantian philosophy, so that the strategic importance of Foucault’s Commentary shall reveal 
itself as a crucial and strategically important piece of work; and consequently so, we shall find 
ourselves in a better position to appreciate the philosophical relationship between Kant and 
Foucault. 
As a result of the Copernican revolution, we saw that the transcendental subject found 
itself in the midst of a paradoxical environment, while “Man’s mode of being” is described by 
Foucault, “as that historical a priori which, since the nineteenth century has served as an 
almost self-evident ground for our thought”114. The paradox is the very characteristic of ‘man’ 
as an historical a priori (of Modernity): his dual position as “the foundation of all positivities 
present … in the element of empirical things”115. Being the “foundation of all positivities” 
means that ‘man’ is himself their conditions of possibility, “that positivities are dependent on 
the transcendental organization of human faculties to be given and understood as such.”116 
Surely, the existence of these positivities (life, labor, language, etc.) does not depend on 
‘man’s existence per se, only “their uncovering as positivities is governed by the 
transcendental opening of human experience”. On the other hand, ‘man’ in his corporeal 
presence occupies also an empirical space, and thus, he is subject also to an empirical finitude 
(we are limited by a vast array of forces, i.e., organic, economic, linguistic, etc); again, this 
empirical finitude opens up the conditions (in the form of a positivities) of the possibility of 
knowledge. Béatrice Han-Pile summarizes this “doubling” in the following way:  
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“The anthropological structure specific to modernity is thus defined from the 
beginning by this doubling of the transcendental subject as an object of empirical knowledge: 
in later Foucault’s terms, the form of subjectivation particular to Man is such that he cannot 
become a subject of knowledge without being inscribed within the horizon of his own 
experience, and thus without appearing to himself as an object of knowledge. For the first 
time in the history of Western knowledge, theoretical subjectivation and objectivation go 
together.”117    
 
However, in the final chapters of The Order of Things, where Foucault deals with the 
paradoxical dual nature of man that we were discussing in this chapter up until now, we 
witness a curious, yet important uncertainty, which is not just an innocent confusion in terms, 
but one that seems like an ambiguity, in the criticism of Kant. Although in the 7th chapter of 
The Order of Things Foucault puts forward the introduction of the transcendental theme as a 
“threshold of our modernity”, in chapter 9 we see Foucault changing his mind: this time he 
asserts that it is the introduction of the “Analytic of Finitude” which defines the threshold of 
our modern times: “Our culture crossed the threshold beyond which we recognize our 
Modernity when finitude was conceived in an interminable cross-reference with itself.”118 In 
the final section of the book, we witness that the transcendental theme had long lost its 
structurally prominent position, as the governing dynamic of reason that was once acclaimed 
to it (page 242), now it appears as one of the “doubles” within the analytic of finitude 
(Foucault mentions three “doubles” that arise as a result of this specific structure of finitude: 
the empirical/transcendental, the cogito/unthought and the retreat/return of language). 
Transcendental theme, therefore, is identified towards the end, “with the contents of 
knowledge, rather than with the space that determines it.”119  
 
Secondly, and equally importantly, the criticism of Kantian philosophy itself seems to 
get confused: for Foucault, Kant is responsible for the “dethronement of the sovereignty of ‘I 
think’” (transparent cogito of Descartes), “when to his traditional trilogy of questions he 
added an ultimate one: the three critical questions (What can I know? What must I do? What 
am I permitted to hope for?) then found themselves referred to a fourth, and scribed as it  
were, ‘to its account’: Was ist der Mensch? This question, as we have seen, runs through our 
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thought from the early nineteenth century: this is because it produces, surreptitiously and in 
advance, the confusion between the empirical and the transcendental, even though Kant had 
demonstrated the divide between them”.120 Here, finally, we may have two Kants!  
 
This situation, of course, raises serious questions: At which point now, are we 
supposed to consider that we have passed the threshold to our modernity? Chapter 7 puts 
forward the clear and distinct “divide”, which introduced the transcendental subject, as the 
distinctive moment; whereas in the 9th, we see this division being blurred with the 
introduction of the fourth question focusing on ‘man’, and both of them are presented to us as 
the mark that signified the end of the classical age, and when finally our modernity had 
begun. Are we to think that there are two opposing versions of the transcendental theme, one 
deemed ‘good’ for Foucault, whereas the other as ‘bad’; as Béatrice Han puts it, “a ‘critical’ 
version that would initially separate the constituting from the constituted, and an 
“anthropological” version that would then superimpose the two elements?”121 If that is the 
case, are we to assume that this introduction of the anthropological fourth question, which 
places the figure of man at its center, transforms the nature of the transcendental theme, while 
accordingly, fundamentally altering the critical project itself? And secondly, as mentioned in 
the first part of this paragraph, how are we to approach the transcendental theme? Should we 
take the transcendental theme as one of the many forms that the Analytic might take (as 
exemplified by the quote above, The Order of Things page 318) or should we perceive it as 
“the primary element from which the Analytic itself must be diachronically understood as a 
deviation resulting from the recentering of Kantian thought on man?” 
 
Foucault, indeed, tries to provide some clarification through a synthesis of the two 
conflicting preceding statements: “The threshold of our modernity, is situated … by the 
constitution of an empirico-transcendental doublet that was called man”.122 Where exactly in 
Kant’s thought should we situate this strange empirico-transcendental doublet, in which one 
of his books we are to look for his emergence? In the 7th chapter of The Order of Things it is 
in The Critique of Pure Reason that we should look for the transcendental theme, since it 
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“questions the conditions of a relation between representations from the point of view 
of what in general makes them possible: it thus uncovers a transcendental field in which the 
subject, which is never given to experience (since it is not empirical) but which is finite (since 
there is no intellectual intuition) determines in its relation to an object = X all the formal 
conditions of experience in general.”123           
 
     However, if we are looking for the emergence of that “empirico-transcendental 
double”, the first Critique seems to be an unlikely place to look for since, according to the 
quote above, the Critique uncovers that transcendental field which is non-empirical. The 
object of Kant’s argument cannot be the ‘man’ of the second Critique also because the subject 
in The Critique of Practical Reason is studied in its capacity (of knowing or acting) as a 
representing/constituting subject and not as a constituted subject. If the empirico-
transcendental double is not a problem of the Critiques, and it is certainly not since the fact 
that they are not presented there, at what point should we locate the connection between the 
transcendental theme and anthropology? 
 
Foucault primarily lays blame on the Neo-Kantians in The Order of Things for 
slipping into the anthropological perversion; from Comte and Marx to Husserl and Sartre, 
Foucault contends that analytic of finitude is at once restricting and falsifying these systems 
of thought. The foundations of his criticism will be dealt with in the final chapters of this 
work, however it is important here to raise the question that whether this “anthropological 
usurpation” of the transcendental theme was already present in Kant’s own thought, 
undermining it secretly but effectively, or is it something that the post-Kantians themselves 
failed (thus, not inherited it from Kant) to consider (or even failed to realize it in the first 
place), a mistake that proved lethal for their theories at the end. When analyzed in this 
context, Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy proves to be, at least, aware of the dangers 
posed by anthropological slippage, and of the pitfalls affected by the analytic of finitude. 
Archaeology and genealogy, in their design, are meant to protect that territory, which 
designates the boundaries to what belongs to history, thus isolating the transcendental, and 
rescuing it from becoming perverted by the anthropological tendency. However, it is crucial 
for Foucault to answer the questions laid down here (rather it is the goal of this work to locate 
the answers within the Foucauldian oeuvre), as Han puts forward “if the possibility remained 
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of isolating a non-anthropological form of the transcendental theme, while analyzing in detail 
the way in which this theme has been perverted, then nothing would prevent Foucault from 
searching elsewhere, notably in what he called the “historical a priori”, a revised and non-
subjective version of the transcendental.”124 
    
It is at this point, I should introduce this curious little text, which will prove its 
fundamental worth at this exact time when the philosophical crossroads had been roughly 
defined, and the obstacles hindering modern philosophy to achieve a certain clarity, according 
to Foucault, had been presented. It is by this way, by introducing Foucault’s second 
(complementary) doctoral thesis125, which consists of a translation of Kant’s “Anthropology 
from a Pragmatic Point of View” and a 128 pages long introduction to this most neglected of 
Kant’s texts, I will try to answer to the critical questions that were posed in the previous 
pages, and try to provide an analysis of the “degree zero” of the debate concerning “‘man’ as 
that strange empirico-transcendental double”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B-5 
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Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View and 
Foucault’s Commentary 
 
In the Commentary, Foucault mainly problematizes the role played by ‘man’ in Kant’s 
thought by primarily focusing on the relation between the Anthropology and the Critique. In 
this work, Foucault has two purposes; one is an exegetical concern, that is, an archeology of 
the Anthropology tracing its diverse roots, what had been added as the years passed by via a 
comparison of its earlier drafts, while asking whether  
 
“was there from 1772 onwards, and underlying perhaps the Critique, a certain 
concrete image of man that no philosophical elaboration essentially altered, and which is 
formulated at last … in the last of Kant’s published texts? … But it is also possible that the 
Anthropology was modified in its central elements as the critical endeavor developed… This 
is to say that the Critique would add to its specific character of being a propaedeutic to 
philosophy a constitutive role in the birth and future of the concrete form of human 
existence.”126    
 
This question reveals the second concern of Foucault’s Commentary, which is 
philosophical. An exegetical analysis of the text is necessary at first, because it is very 
difficult to pinpoint accurately the date of its content: although Kant’s Anthropology is his last 
published text, it is probably the one that he labored the longest, since it was also a course that 
he gave for over thirty years, while making the lecture notes and thus the text itself more and 
more elaborate by constantly changing its content and adding new material. This 
archaeological excavation of the earlier grounds in which Kant’s text stood is important for 
the reason that its starting points (the date Kant opened a course entitled “Anthropology”) lie 
in the pre-Critical period. This is one of the reasons why Foucault is interested in this work in 
the first place: he asks whether there was, before the Critique, an underlying concrete 
conception of man “that no philosophical elaboration [i.e., The Critique of Pure Reason] 
essentially altered.”  
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Secondly, Foucault is particularly interested in Kant’s least discussed work, because 
Anthropology takes the ‘man’ (unlike the Critiques) in his paradoxical identity, as a 
constituting and constituted subject. Foucault mentions at the beginning of his Commentary 
the “proper place” sketched out by Kant, for a possible anthropology (“the space in which an 
anthropology could occupy”127: “a place in which self-observation bears neither the subject in 
itself, nor the pure I of synthesis, but a self which is object and present solely in its 
phenomenal truth. Yet this object I, which is given to the sense in the form of time, is 
nevertheless not alien to the determining subject, since in the end it is nothing but the subject 
as it is affected by itself.”128 Therefore, Kant’s Anthropology would not take as its object 
the “subject in itself”, which was the object of The Critique of Practical Reason; nor it 
would be the “pure I of synthesis”, which was studied in The Critique of Pure Reason. 
The object of the Anthropology is ‘man’ in his paradoxical position as a constituting and 
a constituted subject. Therefore, Anthropology is of great interest for Foucault because 
“contrary to the two Critiques, which are only concerned with the transcendental, it 
takes account of man in his ambivalence as an empirico-transcendental double.”129 It is 
for this reason this marginal text of Foucault becomes significantly important, it 
presents us the only possible venue in which we can answer to the questions concerning 
the ambivalent position of Kant in The Order of Things put forward in the previous 
section. In short, Foucault’s Commentary enables us to trace the different positions that the 
transcendental theme took within the Kantian corpus and to establish once and for all, the 
nature of the relationship between the Anthropology and the Critique (as put forward by 
Foucault himself, the main goal of his Commentary is “to discover what fixed coefficient the 
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Anthropology shares with the critical enterprise”.)130 In the next section, I will introduce 
Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, emphasizing first, its central 
importance within the Kantian corpus and second, the reason underlying Foucault’s interest in 
this text, that is, anthropology being concerned neither with the study of human nature as 
homo natura (man in his animal nature) nor as pure self-consciousness; but rather its being a 
study of man as Menschenwesen. Thus, the Anthropology is the questioning of man’s limits in 
knowledge and concrete existence, ‘man’ in his dual role as a “strange empirico-
transcendental double.” 
 
I 
Kant’s Anthropology: an analysis of ‘Man’ as an “Empirico-
Transcendental Double” 
 
In the Groundwork, Kant divides moral philosophy into two distinctively separate 
parts: the metaphysics of morals (also known as “morals proper” and which was supposed to 
provide the “laws according to which everything ought to happen”) and practical 
anthropology.131 ‘Morals proper’, according to Kant, was thought to be “entirely unmixed 
with any information about what does happen.” Consequently, our knowledge about the 
human nature, which we know through experience, has nothing to offer our knowledge of 
‘metaphysics of morals’.  
 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant repeats the same distinction, and contrasts 
“metaphysics of morals” with “practical anthropology”132 while, in his Lectures on Ethics 
suggesting that the latter should be called    
 
Philosophia moralis applicata, moral anthropology … Moral anthropology is morals that are 
applied to human beings. Moralia pura is built on necessary laws, and hence it cannot base 
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itself on the particular constitution of a rational being, of the human being. The particular 
constitution of the human being, as well as the laws which are based on it, appear in moral 
anthropology under the name of ‘ethics’.133 
 
Here, we see that what Kant considers as practical anthropology is part and parcel of 
“morals, or practical philosophy”, not of theoretical philosophy.134  
 
Although in the Groundwork, Kant clearly separates the domains of ‘morals proper’ 
and ‘practical anthropology’, in the introduction of The Metaphysics of Morals Kant 
establishes an inherent connection between the two fields of practical philosophy. Kant says, 
“A metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of application, and we shall often 
have to take as our object the particular nature of human beings, which is known only by 
experience.”135 Thus, Kant establishes an indispensable link between metaphysics and 
empirical anthropology, insisting that “the system of duties falling under the title of 
‘metaphysics’ consists of pure moral principles insofar as they are applied to human 
nature.”136 For Kant, empirical information about human nature, and metaphysical (a priori) 
principles, both, “determine the content of moral ends and thereby of ethical duties.”137 As 
Wood asserts, for Kant, “such information is to be used not merely in choosing the means to 
moral ends but in determining which ends we ought to set as moral beings.”138 This signifies 
the importance of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic View, and its central place within 
the Kantian corpus, sharing with the Critiques practically an equal weight of the search for the 
means and ends that us, as moral beings, ought to set.  
 
According to Wood, by reallocating the content of a ‘metaphysics of morals’ toward 
the empirical, “Kant is not abandoning or even modifying his fundamental thesis that the 
supreme principle of morality is wholly a priori and borrows nothing from the empirical 
nature of human beings.” Kant, by intertwining these two domains together is only taking 
back his initial claim that a metaphysics of morals can concern only “the idea and the 
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principles of a possible pure will and not the actions and conditions of human volition 
generally.”139 In brief, a metaphysics of morals no longer singly constituted by certain pure 
moral principles, while pure moral law serving as its sole foundation; instead, it is achieved 
insofar as pure moral principles are applied to the empirical nature of human beings.  
 
Although Kant’s own illustrations in the Groundwork concerning the moral principle 
are taken heavily from actual assumptions about human nature (“about the natural 
purposiveness of self-love and of natural talents, about our dependency on the charitable aid 
of other people”, and so on), he does not provide any information about how these substantive 
assumptions relate to any systematic study of ‘morals proper’. As he mentions in “Universal 
Eatural History and Theory of the Heavens” (1755), Kant is not yet sure whether 
anthropology is ready to meet the requirements to be considered as a ‘science proper’, and 
equally importantly, he is solemnly troubled whether human self-knowledge is possible at all: 
 
“It is not even known at all to us what the human being now is, although 
consciousness and the senses ought to instruct us in this; how much less will we be 
able to guess what one day he ought to become. Nevertheless, the human soul’s desire 
for knowledge snaps very desirously at this object, which lies so far from it, and 
strives, in such obscure knowledge, to shed some light.”140 
 
In part, Kant is doubtful over the success of ‘practical anthropology’ because of its 
relatively immature and inadequate state not only when compared to other ‘sciences’, but also 
compared to what in one day it may become. Allen Wood provides us with a crucial 
information about when and why Kant decided to lecture and compile a book from his notes 
on anthropology in the first place (although, particularly in the Groundwork he appears to cast 
himself as someone better suited for a work on the metaphysical side of moral philosophy 
rather than the empirical, or anthropological side): 
 
“Kant’s desire to lecture on anthropology and even to reconceptualize the study of 
human nature was apparently stimulated in 1772 by his dissatisfaction with the 
‘physiological’ approach to the subject taken by Ernst Platner. According to a 1773 letter to 
Marcus Herz, Platner’s popular treatise on anthropology provoked Kant to institute an 
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empirical study of human nature aimed at avoiding Platner’s ‘futile inquiries as to the manner 
in which bodily organs are connected with thought.”141   
 
To an extent some of Kant’s doubts over anthropology result from epistemological 
concerns, in that, for him, anthropology may not meet the standards for scientific knowledge. 
On the other hand, Kant also thought that “what we do know about human nature gives us 
every reason for distrusting our abilities to know ourselves.”142 Empirical psychology, at this 
point, is of crucial importance for Kant. We see him, at the beginning of his lectures on 
anthropology, almost equating the study of empirical psychology with anthropology 
entirely143, although later on, as the lectures and the book itself progress, he starts to refer to 
empirical psychology as that “part of anthropology that deals only with the appearance of 
inner sense (Gemüt)”.144 This distinction that Kant makes between the subject matter of 
empirical psychology, that is the Gemüt, and Geist, which Kant describes as that ‘enigmatic 
nature of reason’ is extremely important in the analysis of the relationship between the 
Critique and Anthropology and will be examined in more detail in the fifth subsection of the 
second chapter (under the section entitled “the Originary”). However, precisely at this point, a 
curious similarity between Kant and Foucault arises: both in his early lectures on 
Anthropology and in the Critique of Pure Reason we see Kant complaining about how people 
tend to confuse questions concerning empirical psychology with those of transcendental 
philosophy, or metaphysics.145 In this section, we have already witnessed his growing 
sensitivity with respect to that patient but frail line separating the empirical and the 
transcendental both in his reactions to Platner, and also in his treatment of empirical 
psychology. In The Order of Things we see Foucault raising similar concerns about the post-
Kantian philosophies, complaining about that dangerous tendency in certain philosophies, 
such as positivism or Marxism, an attempt to subordinate the transcendental completely to the 
empirical: “nature” or “History” as the sole determinants of the conditions of possibility of 
knowledge.     
 
Returning to the topic at hand, and in brief, Kant, although he himself placed the 
question “Was ist der Mensch?” at the very center of any philosophical inquiry, while never 
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offering anywhere what the proper systematic study of this ‘man’ would look like, we see 
Kant struggling with two major problems concerning the productiveness of anthropology: 
first, the question of the proper methodology of anthropology and consequently, whether it 
will ever attain a scientific merit, and second, the obscurity of its subject matter, that is, the 
difficulty of self-knowledge of ‘man’. In the Anthropology, Kant says, “[For] this species is 
only one possible variant of rational nature, yet we are acquainted with no other variants with 
which to compare it and arrive at specific differentia.”146 There is a good chance that what 
certain positivities, e.g., “predispositions and propensities” of human nature, anthropology 
will ever discover, they might only have (and remain to have) a provisional character. 
 
Rationality, for Kant, is a capability of a human being; it is not its primary character. A 
human being is capable of acting rationally; however, this is not what it does constantly and 
unconditionally. Rational behavior is neither a necessary nor a typical exercise of the human 
being.147 Additionally, as Wood puts forward, rational capacities themselves open our nature 
to modification by being the source of perfectibility. In stark contrast to animals, whose lives 
are fixated between certain mediums for they cannot go beyond the barrier set down by their 
instincts; our rationality is precisely the reason for our “indeterminate mode of life”.148 This 
traditional definition of human nature itself is an acknowledgment of its indefinable 
disposition.  
 
For Kant, one of the most important obstacles that hinder anthropology from being 
considered an adequate field of science is the hardships that one faces when trying to catch a 
glimpse of human self-knowledge. While we cannot even be sure about the nature or quantity 
of the laws that govern human nature, human beings themselves block the way to their 
discovery, because of their “essential psychic habits to conceal and disguise their real motives 
and principles, not only from others, but also from themselves.” According to Kant, human 
beings have that strong tendency to obscure with an intention to disguise the truth behind their 
thoughts and actions: “The human being has from nature a propensity to dissemble.”149 Via a 
comparison between “crude and cultivated, educated people”, Kant makes a similar 
observation about the difficulty of human self-knowledge resulting from self-deception and 
                                                 
146 Kant, I. Anthropology, 7: 322 
147 Kant, I. Anthropology, 7: 321 
148 Kant, I. Conjectural Beginning of Human History, 1786, 8: 111-115 
149 Kant, I. Anthropology, 25: 1197 
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self-opacity: “In crude people their entire humanity is not yet developed,” however, when we 
observe more cultivated people, “then [we] run into the difficulty that the more educated the 
human being is, the more he dissembles and the less he wants to be found out by others.”150   
 
For the purposes of anthropology, and therefore for a better understanding of ‘morals 
proper’ or ‘practical philosophy’ in general, ‘self-observation’ is substantially crucial; 
however, Kant says it is also “inherently untrustworthy”: “without noticing what we are 
doing, we suppose we are discovering within us what we ourselves have put there.”151 
Observing others is equally deceptive because the person who is being observed “wants to 
represent himself and makes his own person into an artificial illusion.”152  
 
The main reason underlying the difficulty of both self-observation and observation of 
others, for Kant, is that “when our incentives are active, we are not observing ourselves; and 
when we are observing ourselves our incentives are at rest.”153 Although this last quote from 
Kant seems to imply that “active incentives” only destroy the purpose of the process of self-
observation; in fact, the problem is exactly the same when we observe others: their ‘psychic 
propensity to dissemble’ and their ‘incentives’ to show themselves different from what they 
are disable the observer to get a glimpse of what human nature looks like.  
 
A careful reader would be quick to discern, however, that the “propensities” and 
“incentives” that Kant lays down his argument about the difficulty of attaining “objective” 
knowledge about the human nature (the difficulty of self-knowledge, and knowledge about 
other people) are already important assumptions that he gathers from his own observations of 
human nature. However, this is not at all contradictory: In Kant’s view, anthropology is a 
developing science (which, empirical psychology is only a part), and he is merely trying to 
find certain rules or laws (hopefully without contradicting what he laid forward in his 
Critiques) about the human nature that he can prove as necessary and universal. He says, 
 
“We must concede that psychological explanations are in very bad shape compared to 
physical ones, that they are forever hypothetical, and that for any three different grounds of 
                                                 
150 Kant, I. Anthropology, 25: 857 
151 Kant, I. Anthropology, 7: 133 
152 Ibid. 
153 Kant, I. Anthropology, 25: 857 
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explanation, we can easily think up a fourth that is equally plausible … Empirical psychology 
will hardly ever be able to claim the rank of a philosophical science, and probably its only 
true obligation is to make psychological observations (as Burke does in his work on the 
beautiful and sublime) and hence to gather material for future empirical rules that are to be 
connected systematically, yet to do so without trying to grasp these rules.”154  
 
The standards to be qualified as a science, for Kant, are very high thanks to immense 
improvements in our knowledge about physics; therefore, since certain aspects of 
anthropology, for instance empirical psychology, are in a process of development, 
anthropology “should content itself for the moment with making unsystematic observations, 
which are only later (as science matures) to be taken up into empirical rules.”155 
 
This is exactly the reason why Kant uses examples from Shakespeare’s tragedies, 
Moliére’s comedies, Fielding’s novels, or Hume’s History of England in his lectures and 
notes on the Anthropology as auxiliary sources for a possible anthropology, since they do 
(eventually) provide crucial insights from customs and folkways of different peoples. 
However, for Kant, “local knowledge of the world” must rest on a “general knowledge of the 
world”. Hence, anthropology studies human nature (empirical nature of man) in his cultural, 
social, geographical, etc. surroundings (“man as a denizen of the World”), and does not 
scrutinize human beings in themselves. At this level, Kant is following the formal structure of 
the Critique in setting the quest of the Anthropology as the search for what is necessary and 
universal.  
 
Kant’s definition of this aspect of human nature, that is, his observation that human 
beings are psychologically opaque is reminiscent of Nietzsche and Freud. According to Kant, 
an overwhelming part of our mental life is comprised of “obscure representations”: 
representations that are not accompanied by consciousness, that are only available to us 
through inference.156 The underlying reason for this is that “many of our representations are 
physiological in origin and never need to reach consciousness.”157 However, Kant says, 
                                                 
154 Immanuel Kants Schriften, 4: 471, from Wood, p. 198 
155 Ibid. 
156 Kant, I. Anthropology, 7: 135-137 
157 Wood, Allen, p. 202 
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human-beings are already inclined to make their own representations obscure by pushing 
them into unconsciousness. He says 
 
“We play with obscure representations and have an interest, when loved or unloved 
objects are before our imagination, in putting them into the shadows.”158   
  
In sum, this section guides us in understanding the unique place of Anthropology from 
a Pragmatic Point of View within the Kantian oeuvre: it is concerned neither with the Homo 
natura (the human animal) nor with self-consciousness, but instead, with “Menschenwesen, 
the questioning of man’s limits both in knowledge and concrete existence”159. Therefore the 
Anthropology studies ‘man’ in his strange empirico-transcendental position and its subject 
matter is “not the pure I” of The Critique of Pure Reason, nor the “subject in itself” of The 
Critique of Practical Reason but rather “man, affected by himself.” Consequently, this is the 
work of Kant that Foucault wants to analyze, in order to find out whether the philosophical 
problems that he sees (and warns us in his The Order of Things) in post-Kantian philosophies 
is visible within Kant’s own works (between the Critiques and the Anthropology), or is the 
Kantian project is safe from these accusations. The study of Kant’s Anthropology therefore, is 
crucial for Foucault.  
 
As mentioned before, whether Kant had a concrete image of ‘man’ starting with the 
Anthropology, thus secretly underlying and guiding the Critique; or whether there were 
serious reconsiderations on the part of how ‘man’ is conceived when Anthropology was being 
constantly updated over a course of thirty years is important for Foucault, and there are two 
reasons for that: “if the Critique turned out to be constitutive for the Anthropology in such a 
way that the distinction between the a priori conditions and empirical facts was preserved, 
then the Kantian project on the whole would be free of any empirico-transcendental slippage, 
and Kant’s Anthropology could function as a model and point of reference for subsequent 
anthropologies. If, on the other hand, the relationship between these two works is one of 
reversal, that is, Anthropology not being subordinated to the Critique, instead if it served as its 
substratum (hence, in Foucault’s aforementioned quote “underlying… the Critique), then the 
                                                 
158 Kant, I. Anthropology, 7: 136 
159 Foucault, M. IA, quote taken from Arianna Bove’s translation of the Commentary which is 
a part of her unpublished PhD thesis. (available at: http://www.generation-
online.org/p/fpfoucault1.htm)  
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confusions that were mentioned in the Order of Things as clear and immanent threats within 
the Kantian anthropological/philosophical tradition160 would throw the entire Kantian critical 
project into jeopardy, while putting a question mark over that entire Western tradition of 
thought that stayed loyal to that portrait of ‘man’. This “reversal” argument, therefore, would 
show that this Kantian portrayal of ‘man’ was originally skewed, thus the anthropologico-
critical project is irredeemable within Kant’s own thought. Ambiguously enough, in his 
Commentary Foucault seems to defend both these, clearly incompatible, theses: repetition and 
decentering of the Critique by the Anthropology, respectively with the introduction of two 
opposing themes, namely “the originary” and “the fundamental”, which will be analyzed in 
detail in the next section. 
 
The next section, in order to introduce these symmetrically opposite themes (the 
originary and the fundamental), examines Foucault’s ambiguous reading of the Anthropology. 
As mentioned above, Foucault defends two versions at the same time: Anthropology being a 
“repetition” of the Critique, in which case the uniformity of the transcendental theme is 
preserved; and the other, opposite scenario, that of “reversal” of the Critique, in which case 
the univocacy and inviolacy of the transcendental theme is tarnished. Both of these arguments 
are entertained by Foucault in his Commentary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
160 e.g., confusions between the empirical and the transcendental, such as declaring one’s 
primacy over the other (as exemplified by The Order of Things pitfalls of positivism and 
Marxism in taking the empirical as the primary, preceding determinant of human action, while 
subordinating the transcendental to the modality of the transcendental or to it mode of being, 
in the most general sense) 
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 II 
 The “Degree zero” of Confusions 
 
In the case of Anthropology being a “repetition” of the Critique, Béatrice Han asserts 
that, it would be possible through an “archaeology of the text”161, “to reveal the constitutive 
role of the Critique in “the birth and the evolution of human forms”162: the explicit foundation 
of the Anthropology would then be the transcendental conditions of possibility defined by the 
Critique some twenty-five years earlier.”163 Hence, Foucault says, the Anthropology bears “a 
certain critical truth of man, a truth born from the critique of the conditions of truth.”164 An 
analysis of “the layers that give [the Anthropology] its geological depth” might reveal “the 
genesis of a ‘homo criticus,’ the structure of which would be essentially different from the 
image of man that went before.”165 In the next chapter, this first interpretation, that is “the 
subordination of the Anthropology to the Critique” will be presented with an elucidation of 
the concept of the “fundamental”, “which allows us to think the relation of the empirical and 
the a priori from the perspective that, although symmetrical to that of the Critique, 
nonetheless remains in conformity with it.”166  
 
As mentioned before, this is not the only interpretation of Kant’s text that Foucault 
entertains in his Commentary. Another possibility is laid down with the quote partially given 
previously at this work in page 42: 
 
“In 1772, was there already, perhaps even subsisting in the very depths of the Critique, 
a certain concrete image of man which no subsequent philosophical elaboration would 
substantially alter and which emerges at last, more or less unchanged, in Kant’s last 
published text? Moreover, if that image of man managed to reap the rewards of the 
critical experience, and yet, for all that, still not be subject to any distortion, is this not 
                                                 
161 Foucault, M. IA, p. 19 
162 Ibid. 14 
163 Han, B., FCP, p. 21 
164 Foucault, M. IA, p. 20 
165 Ibid.  
166 Han, B. FCP, p. 21 
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because it had –if not quite organized and determined that experience- then at least 
indicated the direction it might take, acting as its secret guide?”167  
 
     Considering that Kant started working on the Anthropology before he engaged in 
the critical project, and since Anthropology remained unpublished until Kant’s last years, 
Foucault asks whether there is a ‘concrete image of man’ that would have shaped the critical 
enterprise from the beginning, in harmony with the logic that made him to sway away from 
the question of the limits of knowledge (as in the three questions corresponding to three 
Critiques) towards the question of the nature of man (the question that summarizes the goal of 
the Anthropology, and which other questions should be subsumed: “Was ist der Mensch?”). 
Therefore, in opposition to the claim above, that Anthropology being founded by the Critique, 
it may well be that the Anthropology “would be its mute presupposition”. This interpretation 
suggests that there would be an inherently faulty version of the transcendental theme, 
generated by the anthropological questioning (recentering), an “inner fault [faille] affecting 
the transcendental revolution of criticism”.168  
 
These two interpretations (repetition or reversal in the form of decentralization of the 
Critiques), hardly complement to one other, thus they pose a fundamental irreconcilable 
duality in Foucault’s interpretation of Kant’s Anthropology. However, it is not Foucault’s aim 
to provide a coherent reading of Kant, although towards the end of his Commentary he does 
seem to give credit to the Anthropology having a coherent philosophical framework, via his 
analysis of “the fundamental”; however, as mentioned before, the primary aim of the 
Commentary is to understand the relation between the Critique and the Anthropology, so that 
the development of the transcendental theme within the Kantian corpus will be clarified, its 
entanglement with the “birth of man” will be revealed, and therefore first steps of Foucault’s  
                                                 
167 Foucault, M. IA, p. 19 (My italics) 
168 Foucault, M., IA, p. 67 (originally cited in Béatrice Han’s FCP). The parts that she makes 
references to the Commentary are her own translations. I have to admit that, every once in a 
while; I will take recourse in her translations for several reasons: First English translation of 
Foucault’s Commentary is published in 2008 by Semiotext(e), however there had been several 
Foucault scholars who had made personal notes and references in their works to the text 
originally held in the library in Paris. Among them, and including the English translation 
itself, Béatrice Han-Pile offers a much clearer and erudite translation of parts of Foucault’s 
Commentary in her works. Instead of losing all the important nuances by referring to the 
translation of Semiotext(e), I prefer to quote certain portions of the text from B. Han-Pile’s 
FCP. 
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“Analytic of Finitude” will be witnessed as early as 1961, long before The Order of Things. 
As Han summarizes aptly: 
 
 “Should the Commentary establish that the internal evolution of the Kantian corpus 
prefigures in miniature that of modernity, it would be possible to isolate even within the 
Kantian oeuvre itself the paradigm of the first empirico-transcendental “divide”, as well as 
what Roland Barthes might have called the “degree zero” of the “confusions” that enmeshed 
the post-Kantians.”169 Therefore, the Commentary is strategically important to understand the 
initial phases of the “confusions”170 that serve as the foundation for those three events, which 
Foucault identifies with the birth of modernity in The Order of Things: namely, the 
transcendental theme, the birth of ‘man’ and the Analytic of Finitude. This little text 
prognosticates many of the debates (on the nature and influence of the anthropological 
thought) that will be central to the Order of Things, particularly in its final chapter where 
Foucault extends his criticism to post-Kantian anthropologies, via a criticism of Kantian 
anthropology itself.     
 
In the next section, I will try to describe the oppositional interpretations in which 
Foucault analyzes Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, particularly 
focusing on the twin but symmetrically divergent themes, namely the “originary” and the 
“fundamental”. 171 However, first I should at least introduce the contents of Foucault’s 
Commentary: 
 
In the first four chapters of the Commentary, Foucault, through an ‘archaeology’ of 
Kant’s text, analyzes certain connections between Anthropology and a variety of other texts, 
some belong to Kant himself, such as the Critiques, some other works, which Kant deemed 
essential for the study of anthropology as a science, published while he was working on his 
lecture notes and the book itself. The exegetical part, therefore, deals with layers of changes 
that were made to the text, while Kant was constantly renewing and improving his notes. 
However, one should bear in mind that the primary text that Foucault compares and contrasts 
                                                 
169 Han, B., FCP, p. 22 
170 Foucault, M., OT, 341 
171My analysis and interpretation of the originary and the fundamental have been substantially 
influenced by that of Béatrice Han (1998, Eng. Trans. 2002) Therefore, I will refer to her 
“Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical”, along with her 
other articles on the same topic, frequently.  
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the Anthropology with is Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Certain parts of both are, in later 
stages, are taken into consideration in light of the Opus Posthumum. Next two chapters of 
Foucault’s Commentary, on the other hand, investigate “the displacement of the Critique by 
the Anthropology thesis” through an examination of the theme of the ‘originary’. The 
opposite thesis, which is the reading of the Anthropology as a repetition of the Critique is 
introduced in the 7th and 8th chapters with the theme of the ‘fundamental’, which puts forward 
the idea that the Anthropology “would convey the Critique towards ‘transcendental 
philosophy’.172 Kant defines ‘transcendental philosophy”, in the Opus Posthumum173, “as a 
bridge between the system of the a. (a priori) metaphysical principles of ‘science of nature’, 
and b. physics as an (empirical) scientia naturalis.”174 Final sections of the Commentary 
confirm that Kant’s critical philosophy is not incoherent (in itself), by favorably settling on 
the “repetition” thesis, -that is, the Anthropology does not drive the transcendental theme (or 
Kantian critical transcendental philosophy overall) towards an empirical field-, thanks to the 
theme of the ‘fundamental’. In these chapters, Foucault also warns us against the dangers of 
the consequences of anthropological thought “trying to pass itself off as an empirical form of 
criticism.”175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
172 Han, B. Review of Michel Foucault’s Introduction a l’Anthropologie, p. 2 
173 The Opus Postumum is what remains of a work-in-progress that occupied Kant for the last 
decade of his life. It survives as a collection of fascicles or bundles of manuscripts that begin 
in the early 1790s and continue until 1803, shortly before its author’s death. Although not able 
to bring this last work to publication, Kant nevertheless regarded it as completing ‘‘the task of 
the critical philosophy’’ and thought sufficiently highly of his achievement to refer to it as 
‘‘his chief work, a chef d’oeuvre. The Opus Postumum can be seen to mark a number of 
important departures for the critical philosophy, especially with respect to the philosophy of 
science.’’ The central question of the Opus Postumum was ‘‘what is the transition from the 
metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics?’’ Howard Caygill, “The Force Of 
Kant’s Opus Postumum” p. 1 
174 Han, B. Review of Michel Foucault’s Introduction a l’Anthropologie, end note n. 5 
175 Ibid. 
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(Metaphysical Principles      ---------        Transcendental     --------- (Empirical Principles 
of the science of nature)    ---------          Philosophy            ---------  of Scientia Eaturalis) 
             
                                  Critiques             Anthropology           Opus Postumum  
 -Originary, condemns man to a most originary 
passivity, where the conditions laid forward by the 
Critique are referred to an empirical region 
 
 -Fundamental, empirical limitations only make sense                   
when they are referred back to their transcendental 
foundations  
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III 
 “The Anthropological decentering of the Transcendental Theme: The 
Originary” 
 
This theme, “the originary”, which supports “the displacement of the Critique by the 
Anthropology” thesis, first shows itself in the fifth section of the Commentary through an 
analysis of the relation between Kant’s two concepts: Gemüt and Geist. Although, both Geist 
and Gemüt refers to different dispositions of the word “mind” in German; unlike, for instance, 
Verstand, which strongly emphasize the intellect;  Geist has a nuance of “spirit” (espirit), 
while Gemüt has connections with “personality”, “mental state”, “disposition”, or “frame of 
mind”. First, therefore, one should begin with a definition of Gemüt in the sense Kant himself 
used the term, so that an emphasis can be made on what Caygill176 describes as a key term in 
Kant’s philosophy “although it has never been the object of sustained scholarly scrutiny”.177 
Caygill, in his “A Kant Dictionary” describes Gemüt as being  
 
“variously translated as 'mind', 'mental state' and 'soul', even though these translations 
fail to do justice to the term's significance. It does not mean 'mind' or 'soul' in the Cartesian 
sense of a thinking substance, but denotes instead a corporeal awareness of sensation and 
self-affection. ... in [Critique of Pure Reason] he explicitly distinguishes Gemüt and Seele, a 
distinction expounded ... in terms of [Gemüt’s] 'capacity to effect the unity of empirical 
apperception (animus) but not its substance (anima)' (The Critique of Pure Reason, p. 256) 
Gemüt does not designate a substance (whether material or ideal) but is the position or place 
of the Gemütskrafte (the Gemüt's powers) of sensibility, imagination, understanding and 
reason.”178 For Kant, “the Gemüt' is all life (the life-principle itself), and its hindrance or 
furtherance has to be sought outside it, and yet in the man himself, consequently in connexion 
with his body”.179 
 
                                                 
176 Howard Caygill "A Kant dictionary", Wiley-Blackwell 1995 p. 210 
177 Not at least for over a hundred years, since both Heidegger in his Being and Time (1927), 
and Derrida in his Of Soul (1987) make references to this important term. (See pages 27 and 
127, where Derrida describes Gemüt as “the topos of spirit”.)  
178 Ibid. 
179 Kant, I. Critique of Judgment p. 29 (My italics) 
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This interpretation of the Gemüt is Kant's strategy to "bypass many of the problems of 
mind-body relations bequeathed by Cartesian dualism"180 and it also provides a linkage across 
the three theoretical, practical and aesthetic/teleological sections of the critical philosophy 
(hence, sequentially the Critiques) as explicitly stated by Kant, this time in his Anthropology 
where it is described as the “essence [Inbegriff] of all representations which in the same place 
occupy a sphere which includes the three basic faculties of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure 
and displeasure, and the faculty of desire...”181 
 
This nuance displays perfectly why Geist functions, in Foucault’s Commentary, as the 
hinge of the analysis of the Anthropology: while Gemüt refers to the empirical and passive 
nature of ‘man’, which is the subject matter of empirical psychology, for Kant, Geist “permits 
the legitimization –not merely the acknowledgement- of the non identity of the subject with 
its empiricity.” 182  
 
A reminder is necessary here: as mentioned before, the object of the Anthropology is 
the “object/subject I”. It is neither the “pure I” of the first Critique, nor the “subject in itself” 
of the Second; “but a self which is object and present only in its phenomenal truth. Yet 
this object I, which is given to the sense in the form of time, is nevertheless not alien to 
the determining subject, since in the end, it is nothing but the subject as it is affected by 
itself.”183 It is only after –although perhaps somewhat needlessly- repeating this quote, we can 
understand why Foucault describes Geist as effectively providing “a ground for the 
possibility of spontaneous action through which Gemüt is ‘not only what it is, but also 
what it does with itself’.”184 Geist therefore provides the Anthropology with its specifically 
‘pragmatic’ character, with its allusions to noumenal causality. Hence the reason why 
Foucault particularly dwells on the definition of Geist in the Commentary: “its function … 
was to secure the binding of the Anthropology to the Critique.”185 
 
                                                 
180 Howard Caygill "A Kant dictionary", Wiley-Blackwell 1995 p. 210 
181 Kant, I. “Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View”, p. 7 
182 Han, B., FCP, p. 28 
183 Foucault, M. IA, p. 23 
184 Foucault, M. IA, p. 52 
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Geist, similar to the role played by “freedom” in the second Critique, serves as the 
bedrock of ‘pragmatic’186 anthropology with its ‘animating’ (as opposed to “regulative”) 
character, while, on the other hand, Gemüt characterizes that aspect of ‘mind’ which is of 
“empirical and passive nature”. Therefore, contrary to Gemüt, which is the subject-matter of 
psychology, Geist “permits the legitimization –not merely the acknowledgement- of the 
nonidentity of the subject with its empiricity.” In that, Geist is responsible for 
“spontaneity”187, as opposed to an ‘originary passivity’ of mind, characterized by Gemüt.  
 
With a translation from the Anthropology, Foucault defines Geist as “the principle that 
animates the spirit by means of ideas, this is called the Geist”.188 Foucault, in order to provide 
more depth to this ‘animating’ function of the Geist summarizes a section from the ‘Appendix 
to the Transcendental Dialectics’: “[The idea] that is not constituting but that opens up the 
possibility of objects. It does not reveal the nature of things through an ostensive move, but 
indicates how this nature can be sought.”189 Thus, far from being a constituting principle, 
Geist is identified with its animating function, and for Foucault Geist does not have a 
“regulative” function as well, Foucault  
 
“[stresses] instead the dynamic character of ideas, which allow reason to satisfy its 
natural desire for the absolute by outlining for it the horizon of a totality, and therefore by 
giving its sense, as orientation and meaning, to the movement of spirit. The Commentary thus 
establishes a functional parallelism between the dynamic that pushes reason to exceed the 
limits of experience at the theoretical level, and the concrete movement through which Geist 
‘causes the empirical and concrete life of Gemüt to continue on’ (Commentary, p. 52).”190  
 
For the reasons that Geist is responsible for the constitutive disjointing of the subject 
from all nature (as well as from its own nature in the form of Gemüt), this dynamic of ideas 
                                                 
186 “Foucault understands the ‘pragmatic’ as a kind of intermediary between the a priori 
moral imperative and a purely empirical means/ends calculus that would only be governed by 
the principles of efficiency and maximalization. The specificity of the pragmatic is that it 
‘connects homo natura to the definition of man as a subject of freedom.” (Commentary, p. 50) 
Han, B. endnote: 51, p. 204, 
187 Foucault, M. IA, p.50 
188 “Man nennt das durch Ideen behbende Prinzip des Gemüts Geist”, Anthropology, I: 113; 
“Le principe qui anime l’esprit par les idées, c’est le principe spirituel”, Commentary, p. 50    
189 Kant, I. Anthropology, Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectics, Of the Aim of Natural 
Dialectic,  located at p. 550  
190 Han, B., FCP, p. 29 
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could heretofore serve as that basis for the argument that Anthropology, in a sense, repeats the 
Critique, not displaces it. However, as soon as this possibility is revealed in Foucault’s 
Commentary and right after this argument is affirmed by a definition of this function of Geist 
“[tearing] the Gemüt away from its determinations”; Foucault immediately adds that there is 
an inherent mystifying connection between this definition of Geist and what Kant refers to as 
the “enigmatic nature of our reason” in the ‘Methodology’: “Reason is impelled by a natural 
drive to go out beyond the field of its empirical employment, and to venture in a pure 
enjoyment, by means of ideas alone, to the utmost limits of all knowledge, and not to be 
satisfied save through the completion of its course [the apprehension of] a self-subsistent 
systematic whole.” It is with this reference to Kant; Foucault identifies Geist with the 
“enigmatic nature of our reason”, and thus, defines it as “something that would be the kernel 
of pure reason, the un-uprootable origin of its transcendental illusions …, the principle of its 
movement within the empirical field where the faces of truth ceaselessly appear”191 As 
Béatrice Han asserts brilliantly,  
 
“Geist does not, therefore, ‘animate’ only Gemüt, but reason itself, which finds itself 
suddenly deposed from its sovereign position and returned to that of which, from the 
shadows, would have already determined its speculative movement, and which, as its ‘nature’, 
would be constitutively destined to escape it.” 
    
   It is at this point Foucault introduces the theme of the ‘originary’: at the root of our 
empirical and transcendental existence lies an utterly empirical (constitutive, unregulated, and 
animating function of the nature upon our pure/practical reason) movement whereby 
“transcendental conditions, which according to the Critique are timeless (being the condition 
of possibility of chronological time), are temporalised within experience by the Anthropology 
and consequently appear within the empirical field as pre-existing themselves (and thus 
originary, or ‘primitive’, as Derrida puts it in reference to Husserl).192 This theme of the 
‘originary’ “seems to refer the Critique from its apex, to an empirical region, to a domain of 
facts where man would be condemned to a most originary passivity”.193 Hence, Foucault 
understands Geist as an ‘originary fact’ via its connections to (empirical) nature and this 
empirical form is the source in which reason will “find both its truth and the source of its 
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empirical determinations that bear upon it.”194 Therefore, neither reason can master nor can it 
escape its (transcendental) essence, while at the same time, being subject to empirical 
limitations, nor can it master or escape the empiricities that engulf and overwhelm it.  
 
This definition of Geist refers the Critique to an empirical reason, because, as it is 
revealed in the Anthropology, it opens up the way to a previously rejected possibility (rejected 
in the Critique): the possibility that the transcendental foundations of our reason should be 
referred to their empirical conditions of possibility (or, to their empirical origins or essence, to 
their empirical limits, possibilities, etc.). This means that, man and his being as ‘a denizen of 
this world’, is marked with a ‘most originary positivity’, which comes before any other 
constituting activity, a form of originary passivity that Foucault would refer ‘man’ to the 
empiricities of life, labor and language in The Order of Things, the primary form of which, as 
demonstrated, originates from his definition of Geist in the Commentary. 
 
Foucault explains this deviation of the transcendental theme in the following way: 
  
“Therefore, the relationship between the given and the a priori takes in the 
Anthropology a structure that is the reverse of that which was uncovered by the Critique. 
What was a priori in the order of knowledge becomes in the order of concrete existence an 
originary that is not chronologically first, but which, as soon as it has appeared … reveals 
itself as already there.”195  
 
The notion of the originary therefore establishes the impossibility of confirming to the 
foundation established by the Critique, once the empirical determinants (i.e., the order of 
‘concrete existence’) of the transcendental foundations of reason are explicated. The 
retrospective movement of the originary (as if it pre-exists itself) marks this impossibility: 
“What is from the point of view of the Critique, an a priori of knowledge, does not transpose 
itself immediately, through an anthropological reflection, as an a priori of existence, but 
appears within the density of becoming where a sudden apparition necessarily takes in 
retrospection the meaning of an already there (déja la).”196 In order for the transcendental 
conditions of knowledge reveal themselves as ‘already there’, they have to –paradoxically- 
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pre-exist their own empirical ‘emergence’; however, in consequence of this retrospection, 
these transcendental conditions can no longer claim their original and unique independence as 
Kant has allotted to them in the Critique. Hence Foucault defines the originary, first and 
foremost, as a 
 
“…a worrying notion, which seems to suddenly refer the Critique at its apex towards 
an empirical region, a domain of fact where man would be destined to a most originary 
passivity. All of a sudden the transcendental would be repudiated, and the conditions of 
experience would refer to the primary inertia of nature”.197   
 
Thus, the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental has to be defined 
anew after Anthropology, as Béatrice Han puts it aptly, in the form of a relationship of a 
‘retrospective presupposition’. The dual nature of man as empirical and transcendental, 
requires the a priori to reveal itself within concrete experience; “but it can only do so insofar 
as it is presupposed by experience as that of which it is the condition of constitution, the fact 
that it can never be simultaneous with itself and must remain inscribed within a logic of 
recurrence signaling its heterogeneity from the empirical.”198  
 
However, this movement has the obvious risk of throwing the Kantian (critical) 
enterprise in jeopardy, because the clear division between the empirical and the transcendental 
that was established with the Critique undergoes an inflection with the introduction of the 
‘originary’, which devotes “the anthropological search for a foundation that is by definition 
denied to it by its theoretical presuppositions and the ambivalence of its object.”199 
Accordingly, Foucault defines Anthropology as a “knowledge of man, by a movement that 
objectifies the latter at the level and in the content of its animal determinations; but it is also 
the knowledge of the ‘knowledge of man’, in a movement that questions the subject itself 
about its own limits and what it makes possible in the knowledge that it takes of itself.”200  
 
Foucault develops the concept of the originary (also a display of the blur between the 
transcendental and the empirical) with “the emergence of the spoken-I”, an intermediary term 
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between the pure-I of the synthesis and the empirical ego. Kant, in the “Transcendental 
Analytic” (first division of the Transcendental Logic, in his Critique), subordinates the 
empirical-I to the transcendental-I, thus making the pure-I of the transcendental apperception 
the condition of possibility of the empirical ego. However, the Anthropology, introduces (and 
makes its object) this third term, the spoken-I, as the 
 
“empirical and manifest form, in which the synthesizing activity of the 
[transcendental] I appears as an already synthesized figure, an indissociably primary and 
secondary structure: … when it appears, inserting itself in the multiplicity of a sensory 
chronicle, it presents itself as already there.”201 
 
The emergence of the spoken-I by itself disturbs the neat balance and the clear 
division established in the Critique between the pure-I of metaphysics and empirical-I of 
physics, also distorts the distinction between activity and passivity: ‘intellectual syntheses’ 
and ‘sensory dispersion’. For Foucault, Han says, “the spoken I is neither the pure I of 
transcendental apperception nor the empirical ego offered to the inner sense through the form 
of time, but a hybrid form, both active and passive, a condition of possibility of experience 
which is nevertheless inscribed within experience itself on the paradoxical mode of 
preexistence.”  
 
 In consequence of this retrospective movement of the originary, the empirical nature 
of man (‘the content of its animal determinations’), in the Anthropology, becomes the “a 
priori limit of his knowledge”, so that, according to Han, “the empirical understanding of that 
the subject forms of itself now supposedly generates a knowledge of what the subject is in its 
constitutive power.”202 Consequently, the constituting power of the transcendental, evidenced 
by the Critique, is now reversed: “the [empirical] knowledge of man” becomes “a [pseudo-
transcendental] knowledge of man.”203 Foucault, in one of his interviews, refers to this 
situation as a “total parallogism”: “As soon as one tries to define an essence of man which 
could articulate itself from itself, and which at the same time would be the foundation of all 
                                                 
201 Ibid. 41-42 
202 Han, B. p. 31 
203 Foucault, IA, p. 118 
 73 
possible knowledge [knowledge of oneself, others, and the world], one swims in total 
parallogism.”204        
 
    The originary reveals the anthropological necessity to refer the transcendental (a 
priori) conditions of the possibility of knowledge and experience back to the positivities that 
constitute man “in his empirical state”, thus creating an insidious logic, which aims to “make 
the man of nature, exchange and discourse [man in his empirical finitude] serve as the 
[transcendental] foundation of his own [empirical] finitude.”205 It is with this inflexion of the 
transcendental theme that Kantian anthropology establishes man as “an empirico-
transcendental double.” In a similar vein Foucault announces in The Birth of the Clinic: “the 
possibility for the individual being both subject and object of his own thought implies an 
inversion in the structure of the finitude … The anthropological structure that then appeared 
played both the critical role of limit and the founding role of the origin.”206 About the same 
inversion Foucault adds, this time in the Commentary: 
 
“The insidious values of the question of ‘Was ist der Mensch?’ are responsible for this 
homogeneous, destructured, and indefinitely reversible field in which man presents his truth 
as the soul of truth.”207 In a similar vein elsewhere in the Commentary, Foucault says that 
self-consciousness appears in the Anthropology “as the always re-emerging temptation of a 
polymorphous egoism” and not as “a form of experience and condition of limited but founded 
knowledge” as it is defined in the Critique: consequently, “the possibility of saying ‘I’ gives 
rise, in consciousness, to the prestige of a ‘me good-soul’ (moi bien-aime) that fascinates it, to 
the extent that, in a paradoxical return, consciousness will renounce the language of this first 
person –as decisive as to what has been  – to decline itself in the fiction of a We.”208    
 
The final chapters of The Order of Things repeats the same criticism, which as we 
have seen Foucault already introduced with the Commentary, that is the definition of 
(philosophical) anthropology as “the fundamental disposition, which has governed and 
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controlled the path of philosophical thought from Kant until our own day”209 as long as, in 
this thought, man is presented and understood as “such a being that knowledge will be 
attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible.”210 It is in the process of 
anthropologization of the transcendental theme, the “Analytic of Finitude” anchors its truth in 
this “Analytic of Man”.211 Hence, Foucault says in the Commentary,  
 
“One has tried to turn the Anthropology (which is nothing but another way of 
forgetting the Critique) into the field of a positivity from which all human sciences would 
derive their foundation and their possibility, whereas in fact it can only speak the language of 
limit and negativity.”212  
 
Finally, for Foucault, this ‘transposition’ has two grim consequences: first, we may 
lose the philosophical foundation established by the Critique, that is, the ability to ground the 
possibility of empirical knowledge -thus provide it with a place and a meaning-, since the 
clear divide between the empirical and the transcendental is now lost. For Foucault this opens 
the way for skepticism. Second, anthropology will have to rise up to the challenge and play 
the part that was previously attributed to the Critique, by providing empirical contents with 
transcendental value. This consequence is what Foucault refers to as the ‘anthropological 
slumber’, which had haunted Western philosophy ever since Kant. The final chapters of The 
Order of Things are dedicated to the analysis of the anthropological slumber, or to the 
problem of ‘Man’ and his immediate ‘doubles’, that is, The Analytic of Finitude, which 
defines modern ‘man’s mode of being, whereby positivity of his knowledge about himself is 
inherently and immediately connected to his ‘finitude’. Thus, Western philosophy after Kant, 
since it was Kant himself that established such a ‘mode of being’ in the modern épistéme, is 
now in a deadlock, imprisoned to think of the infinite back and forth between (or the 
reduplication of) the empirical and the transcendental, the perpetual relation of the cogito to 
the unthought, and the retreat and return of the ‘origin’.   
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IV 
 “The Fundamental”: Anthropology as the repetition of the Critique 
 
 
 The ‘originary’ is not the only form of relationship between the Anthropology and the 
Critique that Foucault investigates in his Commentary. Ambiguously enough, Foucault 
introduces another theme, which is incompatible with the first (the originary) and in fact, its 
symmetrical opposite: the theme of the fundamental upholds the idea that the Anthropology 
can also be read as a repetition of the Critique, -that is, without paving the way to an 
inflection of the transcendental theme, as it is put forward by the originary - by conserving 
and confirming the clear division between the empirical and the transcendental. Béatrice Han 
describes the function of the fundamental in Foucault’s Commentary as “to ensure, through a 
dynamics which both inverts and complements that of transcendental foundation, the return 
from post-hoc to a priori.”213 Not only, with the theme of the fundamental, Foucault reads 
Kant’s Anthropology as a form of repetition of the Critique, but we will see in the later parts 
of this section; with the theme of the fundamental and in light of the Opus Postumum, the 
Anthropology completes the project of transcendental philosophy, with a move exactly 
opposite to that of the Critique, that is, an analysis of the empirical limitations to (or, “the 
positivity of”) our knowledge, while insisting on the necessity to refer them back to our 
transcendental foundations/limitations (the synthesizing activity of the subject itself); thus, the 
Anthropology reaffirms the Critique.  
 
In the Critique Kant expresses clearly the universal (transcendental) structures which 
our experience would necessarily have to agree, before any empirical exploration or 
foundation; the Anthropology by repeatedly reminding us (through the concept of the 
fundamental) the necessity, or rather, the “obligation” to refer the empirical contents of 
knowledge back to their a priori (transcendental) foundations. Anthropology thus confirming 
the Critique and henceforth preventing us from relapsing into “a naïve empiricism” or a 
“naturalistic perspective in which a science of man would involve knowledge of nature.”214 In 
the Commentary the notion of the fundamental is developed through the theme of 
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‘anthropological repetition’: an analysis of the relationship between the Anthropology and the 
Critique as a form of ‘repetition’.   
 
Anthropology not only asks similar questions like that of the Critique, but also, the 
answers within which it conveys its research is located in the same transcendental ground 
described by the Critique. This level, that is Critique providing the Anthropology both the 
questions that it could ask and the ground in which these questions would ultimately have to 
be referred to, Foucault describes as “the structural fact of the anthropologico-critical 
repetition”: the Anthropology takes up the questions that pertain to the Critiques and in fact 
“the Anthropology does not say anything else than the Critique.”215   
 
First form of repetition is therefore an act of ‘mirroring’, that is, the Anthropology 
repeating the arguments put forward by the Critique. Second, the Anthropology could also 
repeat the Critique by already and implicitly assuming its structural-philosophical grounds. 
While in its structure and constitution bound to the Critique, thus by presupposing its 
foundational arguments, the Anthropology necessarily repeats the Critique at the formal level. 
Third, the Anthropology could repeat the Critique by providing it with new material from the 
‘positivities’ of i.e. life, labor and language, which would not only fit but also complement to 
its methodological underpinnings; thus, bringing Kant’s critical project to a completion, while 
of course, carefully avoiding not to transform the project itself all too greatly. Fourth, and 
final form of ‘repetition’ provides a new role for the Critique and perhaps for the Kantian 
critical enterprise overall by carrying the Critique “toward a more finished form, of which 
anthropology was itself its hidden presupposition …”216 At this level, repetition receives its 
greatest range and the Anthropology takes central place among the works of Kant being a 
mediation between all the different periods of Kant’s thought: Pre-critical, Critical, and Post-
critical period, which was brought in to publication only after Kant’s death with the title of 
Opus Posthumum.   
 
Béatrice Han provides four fitting titles for these “four forms of repetition” that 
correspond to “four possible relations between the Anthropology and the Critique: mirroring, 
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foundation, complementarity, or mediation, all of which are entertained by the 
Commentary.”217  
 
a. First form of repetition is a formal repetition, different ways in which the 
Anthropology simply mirrors the Critique. Not only Kant organizes the formal content, along 
with the chapter divisions, and headings of his Anthropology in harmony with the formal 
structure of the Critique218, also the line of questioning (or the line of interrogation) itself 
follows in the wake of the Critique. As Foucault says, “The internal structure of the 
Anthropology and the question that animates it has the same form as the critical interrogation 
itself.” Thus, there is, in the Anthropology “a claim to know the possibilities and limits of 
knowledge: it mimics, from the outside and with the gestures of empiricity, the movement of 
Critique.”219  
 
b. However, the relation between the Anthropology and the Critique is not only one of 
mimicry, but more importantly they share a foundational link: beyond the simple parallelism 
between the texts, there is in the Anthropology an inherent acceptance of the foundations of 
the Critique. In the Commentary Foucault says that, “the empiricity of the Anthropology 
cannot ground itself in itself. It cannot encompass the Critique, but must refer to it: and the 
reason it looks like its empirical and external analogon is because it rests upon some already 
named and uncovered structures of the a priori.” Therefore, the Anthropology has to refer to 
the Critique (or as Foucault puts it, ‘it cannot fail but refer to it’) because the field of 
experience that anthropology conducts its analyses rests already upon the conditions of 
experience laid down by the Critique. This second form of repetition is a result of the 
Copernican turn itself, which results in subordination of the ‘applied’ philosophy to ‘pure’ 
philosophy.220 In sum, in this second possible form of ‘repetition’, the Anthropology is itself a 
result of the opening made possible by the Critique, that is, not only its methodology and the 
nature of its field of analysis are naturally constituted by the Critique, but its empirical 
findings, by constitution, has to conform with their transcendental conditions of possibility. 
Thus, from this point of view, the Anthropology only has significance insofar as the 
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transcendental field established by the Critique founds the same place within which such an 
anthropology could exist in the first place. Hence, in the second possible ‘repetition’, the 
relation between the texts is ‘foundational’.      
 
c. The third form of ‘repetition’ reads both Anthropology and Critique as two reverse 
form of analysis in the investigation of man, reverse in the sense that, one deals with his 
transcendental nature, while the other provides empirical information from the ‘outside’: if the 
latter is an “investigation of the conditioning in its foundational activity”, the former is an 
“inventory of what is unfounded in the conditioned.”221 The Critique is described as an 
‘investigation’, that is, a form of analysis that justifies its conclusions as it methodologically 
progresses, while the Anthropology is regarded as an ‘inventory’, a collection of empiricities 
whose foundation we cannot locate in the ‘faculties’ themselves, therefore those that risk 
illusion and error. Thus, Foucault says: “The Anthropology follows the division of faculties of 
the Critique: but its privileged domain is not that of their positive power, but where they risk 
losing themselves.”222 The Critique, being the foundation of the critical era of Kant, 
undoubtedly intended to rid the Kantian oeuvre  of the transcendental use of reason by 
'denouncing' and ‘dismantling' it, with a constant referral of the faculties to their (empirical) 
domain of positivity. The faculties in the Anthropology however, follow a path that is open to 
'abuses' or 'deviations'. 
 
Therefore, this last published text of Kant gives details about certain ‘eventual abuses’ 
that become apparent in the empirical manifestations of the faculties, which according to 
Foucault, the Anthropology does indeed continue to scrutinize. Thus, the eventual 
ambivalence of our experience is one of the reasons, Foucault adds, why certain concepts that 
were already defined by the Critique carry the necessity to go through certain redefinitions in 
the Anthropology: considering possible confusions in the empirical use of our faculties, “self-
consciousness” can no longer be defined as the “form of experience and condition of 
knowledge, that is, limited but founded,” but instead, it is defined as the “temptation of a 
polymorphic egoism”223.  Experience cannot be trusted because “possible experience defines, 
in its limited circle, the field of truth just as well the field of the loss of truth.”224 
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Anthropology, therefore defines a domain of a possible disorientation in the empirical use of 
our faculties, rather than transcendental; and thus completing in a way, the Critique by 
bringing into light, the simultaneous presence of opposing impulses (from experience) 
towards the same faculty causing the ambivalence of our experiences.  
 
As Béatrice Han puts forward, the Anthropology underlines the opposition between 
Schein (appearance in essence, semblance) and Erscheinung (appearance in phenomena as 
opposed to the thing-in-itself)225 “by insisting on the seduction of appearances, rather than on 
the founded character of phenomena; where the Critique only gave the ‘possibilities in the 
order of conditions’, the Anthropology examines the risks inherent in the empirical 
engagement of the human faculties.”226 In different terms, in its relation to the Critique 
(which is an 'investigation' of what is conditioning in foundational activity), the Anthropology 
"represents the investigation [or an inventory] of the unconditioned within the conditioned. In 
the anthropological region [however], there is no synthesis that is not threatened: the domain 
of experience is almost emptied of content by dangers that are not of the order of arbitrary 
supersession, but of the collapsing on itself. Possible experience defines equally well, in its 
limited circle, the field of truth and the field of the loss of truth.”227  
   
 
d. The final form of repetition regards Anthropology as a mediator among all of Kant’s 
works (including and particularly in light of the Opus Posthumum), with a function of 
bringing the project of “transcendental philosophy” into completion, whose theoretical 
foundation (its first secure step) was laid forward by the first Critique but remained an 
incomplete project even after Kant finalized his three Critiques. It is in the Opus Postumum 
that Kant defends the unity of theoretical and practical reason.228 Hence, he regards both the 
Critique and the Anthropology as two sides of the same coin (transcendental philosophy). 
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Thus, from this perspective, the Anthropology completes the Kantian enterprise, first by 
presupposing the critical perspective in its totality (this aspect of the Anthropology had 
already been emphasized above), and more importantly, the Anthropology adds to its 
achievement, to its realization. As Foucault says, the Anthropology is, ironically “marginal 
for the Critique, and decisive for the forms of reflection that would claim as their task its 
achievement.”229  
 
The primary reason behind Foucault’s attribution to Anthropology the role of a 
mediator stems from Foucault’s reading of the Opus Posthumum. The mediating role of the 
Anthropology results from the ‘character of its object’: man, in the sections of the Opus 
Posthumum that deals with the transcendental philosophy, is described as the ‘medium 
terminus’: mediating both the world and God, which were both described as ‘ideas of pure 
reason’ in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ (of The Critique of Pure Reason). Man is the 
medium where these two ideas are united, the “concrete and active unity in which and for 
which God and the world find their unity.”230 Man’s synthesizing function between these two 
pure ideas, of the world and God, becomes only possible in his dual role as an empirically 
determined object and transcendentally constituting subject, as Béatrice Han puts it aptly, man 
can achieve this synthesis “in his properly anthropological dimension.”231 Foucault, without 
transition, asks the proper way in which one should understand such a unity: “What is the 
correct meaning of this unification of God and the world in man and for man? What synthesis 
or what operation confronts it? Can it be situated at the level of the empirical or of the 
transcendental, of the originary or of the fundamental?” 
 
Primarily, Foucault says, and deriving his conclusions in light of the Opus 
Posthumum, what attests to man’s role as the ‘medium terminus’ is his synthetic ability as a 
thinking subject232, which were already laid forward in the Critique. Hence, man “affects 
himself in the movement by which he becomes an object for himself. … The world is 
uncovered … as the figure of the movement by means of which the ego, becoming an object, 
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inscribes itself within the field of experience and finds a concrete system of belonging.”233 
Hence, Foucault says, 
 
“This unifying act is then the synthesis itself of thought. But it can be defined exactly 
in this sense starting from the power where it takes its origin: ‘Gott und die Welt, und der 
Geist des Menschen der beide denkt’ [God and the World, and the spirit of man thinks the two 
of them]; where everything is thus well considered in its sole form, as if with God, the world 
and man, in their coexistence and their fundamental relations, the structure itself of judgment 
is brought back onto the regime of traditional logic; the trilogy Subjekt, Praedikat, Copula 
define the figure of the relation between God, the world and man. [Man is then] that which is 
then the copula, the link- like the verb ‘to be’ of the judgment of the universe.”234  
 
However, man on the other hand should also be understood as a “citizen of the world” 
from the very beginning. Thus, secondly, man owes his intermediate position to his ‘proper 
anthropological position’, that is, being a resident of the world. Foucault defines what he 
means by ‘man as a citizen of the world’ with references to the pragmatic aspect of Kant’s 
Anthropology in the following way: 
 
“The Anthropology is pragmatic in the sense that it does not envisage man as 
belonging to the moral city of spirits (that would be named practical), nor to the civil society 
of the subjects of law (that would be named juridical); he is considered as a ‘citizen of the 
world’, which means as a member of the concrete universal within which the subject of law, 
determined by judicial rules and subjected to them, and is at the same time a human being 
who in his freedom carries his universal moral law. To be a citizen of the world is to belong to 
a certain region that is as concrete as an ensemble of precise judicial rules that are as universal 
as the moral law. To say that an anthropology is pragmatic and to say that it envisages man as 
a citizen of the world amounts to saying the same thing.”235 
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Therefore, although man is the synthesis of both the world and God, that it is in him 
both are actually unified, and yet with respect to God man is a limited being, and in regard to 
the world he is merely one of its inhabitants.236  
 
It is precisely at this point, Foucault says, the anthropological repetition comes to aid 
in an effort to rescue the transcendental philosophy from two alarming dangers. First, a 
definition of ‘man’ as a ‘denizen of the world’ underlying the human ambivalence would 
generate a circular tendency to refer “any reflection on man to a reflection of the world”237, 
and, the other way around. Second, and following from the first, this circular reasoning would 
reduce and even annul man’s position as a constituting agent, thus his transcendental 
capabilities would be forgotten for the sake of a return to a ‘pre-critical empiricism’, which 
would only allow “empirical and circular relationships of immanence, at the level of a 
necessary natural knowledge” between man and the world.238 Anthropological repetition, at 
this point, reminds us the necessity of a transcendental foundation for empirical contents, that 
is, the need to refer the positivities back to their transcendental foundations, “thus 
distinguishing carefully between transcendental determinations and positive limitations.”239 
As a result, the Anthropology helps to bring the project of transcendental philosophy into 
completion (“They [the Anthropology and the Opus Posthumum taken together] are possible 
paths and tests for a thought that advances on the ground of a finally attained transcendental 
philosophy. And at each instant, every time the geography of these new territories needs to be 
located, the interrogation on man emerges as the question to which the entire problematic of 
the world and God cannot avoid to be related to.”240)   
 
The theme of man as a “denizen of the world” is laid forward in the Opus Posthumum 
in its tripartite structure: world; as the source of knowledge, the domain of action, and the 
limit of all possible experience. World is our only source of knowledge (thus, there is no 
asseverations for the absolute) insofar as the “transcendental correlation between passivity 
and spontaneity”, that is, insofar as the transcendental subject a priori unites sensibility and 
understanding.241 As Han explains in her review of Foucault’s Commentary, “the world 
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provides sensory impressions which, received through the forms of space and time (passivity), 
are synthesized by the activity of the understanding (spontaneity).”242 Therefore, the world as 
source of knowledge presents itself on the manifold of the possible sensations which indicates 
the originary passivity of our sensibility; however, the source of this knowledge is 
“inexhaustible precisely because this originary passivity is indissociable from the forms of 
Vereinigung [merging] of spontaneity and of the spirit [Geist].” Thus, Foucault says 
 
“Differently from the universe, the world is given within a system of actuality that 
envelops all real existence. It envelops existence because as well as being the concept of its 
totality, starting from the world, existence develops its concrete reality: a double meaning 
enclosed in the very world Inbegriff [essence]. ‘Der Begriff der Welt ist der Inbegriff des 
Dasein’ [the concept of the world is the essence of existence]. The world is the root of 
existence, the source that, by containing it, simultaneously retains and frees it.”243 
 
On the same ground, the world can only be our domain of action (that not only 
originates our actions but also imposes limits on them from the very beginning) “against the 
background of a transcendental correlation between necessity and freedom”244; explained by 
Kant in the Transcendental Dialectics as the ground in which human beings can both be 
empirically constituted and noumenally free. Therefore, although the knowledge of the world 
is available to us “in the gripped solidarity of determinism”, this is only to send us back to “a 
priori syntheses of a judging subject (eines urteilenden Subjekt).” Foucault explains this 
second point in the following way: 
 
“One can only have – by definition – one universe. The world, on the other hand, 
could be given in numerous examples (‘es mag viele Welte sein’). The universe is the unity of 
the possible, whilst the world is a system of real relations. This system is given once, and it is 
not possible for the relations to be other [than what they are]; but absolutely nothing impedes 
to conceive another system or other relations to be defined differently. This is to say that the 
world is not the open space of the necessary, but a domain where a system of necessity is 
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possible [in the form of man and his synthetic ability stemming from his status as a thinking 
subject].”245 
 
Third, and last, the limit of our all possible experiences is the world itself. Thus, ideas 
themselves alone cannot have any constitutive use or effect, because “reason has anticipated 
the totality and has prethought it precisely as a limit.”246 Put it differently, the external 
limitations that surround ‘man’ can and will only appear as such because they are already 
translated into the transcendental level, “by a reason that has nonetheless shown its finite 
character by its lack of intellectual intuition.”247 Synthesizing with the first two levels, 
Foucault introduces the third form, that is, world as a limit of all possible experience, in the 
following way: 
 
“…one cannot avoid recognizing that there cannot be but one world: ‘Es mag nur Eine 
Welt sein’. Because the possible is only thought starting from a system given by actualité; and 
the plurality of worlds is only delineated starting from an existing world and from what can be 
offered to experience: the world is ‘das Ganza aller moglichen Sinnen Gegenstander’. The 
correlative of the possibility of conceiving of other worlds, -whereby the world is nothing but, 
de facto, a domain- consists in the impossibility of surpassing it and the imperious necessity 
of accepting its frontiers as limits. Thus the world, taken back in its signification as ‘Inbegriff 
des Daseins’ appears according to a triple structure, conforming to ‘Begriff der Inbegriff’ 
[complex, or essence of existence], of source, of domain, and limit.”248 
 
Thus, this final form of ‘anthropological repetition’ serves the purpose of bringing the 
critical thought to “the level of the fundamental, and to substitute for systematic divisions the 
organization of transcendental correlates.”249 Hence revealed is the central importance of the 
Anthropology: “it carries the a priori towards the fundamental”. The ‘fundamental’ had never 
been defined in an open way, neither in the Commentary nor in The Order of Things, 
however, after reviewing the Commentary in light of the Opus Posthumum there is now 
sufficient information that enable us to reach a satisfying definition: According to Gary 
Gutting “finitude as founding is the ‘fundamental’, and finitude as founded is the 
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‘positive’”250, and Dreyfus & Rabinow identify the term with the ‘conditions that allow 
knowledge’: finitude as limitation is the positive and finitude as source of all facts is the 
fundamental.251 My own interpretation is similar to that of Gutting’s.   
 
The origin of the word ‘fundamental’ clearly submits to ‘transcendental foundation’ 
but it is essentially different from the necessity to ground the empirical to the transcendental 
“according to the top-down logic of foundation described in the Critique; the ‘fundamental’ 
allows us to think the opposite direction (hence the ‘reverse repetition’ detailed above) “by 
showing that empirical limitations can only make sense in reference to the transcendental 
determination that they unknowingly presuppose.”252 The Critique informs us about the a 
priori foundations, thus forms that experience must take; the fundamental, from the opposite 
direction, starts from the empirical contents of experience and reveals how they are marked by 
“irreducible transcendences”253, which reminds us constantly that empirical cannot ground 
itself in itself, that is, it cannot be its own foundation. Thus, Han says, “the theme of the 
fundamental is structurally tied to the retrospection through which empirical finitude always 
appears as already transcendentally founded.”254  
 
By opening up that space in which it becomes possible to analyze the empirical in the 
concrete forms that it takes (‘concrete form of existence’ as it is referred to in the 
Commentary) and still to be able to refer them to their (transcendental) foundations, that is 
with the theme of the ‘fundamental’, therefore, the Anthropology constructs the “passage from 
the a priori to the fundamental, from critical thought to transcendental philosophy.”255 
According to Han, the mediating character of the Anthropology  
 
“does not only come from its object, but from the terrain that it defines: insofar as it 
opens onto the thinking of the ‘fundamental’, the Anthropology offers the only version of the 
transcendental theme that, far from perverting criticism, completes it by reversing its first 
perspective, while insisting on the necessity of referring the limitations brought by empirical 
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contents (the general model of which is the “world”, as understood in the Opus Postumum) to 
their transcendental conditions of possibility.”256 In stark contrast to this important theme that 
is highlighted by Kant in the Anthropology, the primary error of “philosophical 
anthropologies” after Kant, Foucault says, is to assume that there could be a “natural 
access”257 to the fundamental, that is, an extrapolation that the empirical could “free itself 
from a preliminary critique of knowledge and from a primary question about the relationship 
to the object.”258 The direct result of this would be those anthropologies, which take the 
empirical as its own foundation by ascribing it a ‘scientific’ position, “which all the human 
sciences would derive their foundation and their possibility.”259 Kant’s Anthropology, from 
the ‘anthropological repetition’s apex, thus “within the wake of the Critique refers the 
anthropology (as a field) to the established primacy of the a priori over the empirical, and 
therefore, Han says, “ produces, by means of the concept of the ‘fundamental’, the model of 
the only relation that can be established legitimately from the empirical toward the 
transcendental –and the paradigm from which Foucault will find it easier to think through the 
post-Kantian deviations.”260 
 
It seems that Foucault, saves the Anthropology, or in general, the Kantian philosophy 
from the pitfalls of the anthropologic slumber and thus from the grips of the analytic of 
finitude with the theme of the ‘fundamental’ in his Commentary; however, post-Kantians, for 
him, are in bad shape. Therefore, it would be my guess to suggest that Foucault is trying to 
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play Kant off against neo-Kantians, and warning them, with the aid of the theme of the 
‘originary’, against the dangers of formalizing those philosophical (‘scientific’) activities, 
which in fact belong to epistemology, while at the same time “philosophically grounding the 
impossibility of a rational psychology, that is, one that accounts for the workings of the soul 
as unaffected by empirical modifications arising out of sensation.”261  
 
With the theme of the ‘fundamental’, therefore, Foucault insists that Kant’s 
Anthropology represents a successful attempt in the field of empirical investigation, which, 
without contradicting the foundations laid by the Critique, the Anthropology not only extends 
its scope, but also carries the Kantian transcendental philosophy to completion. In contrast to 
Kant’s achievements in Anthropology (or in the field of anthropology as a ‘science’), one 
must, Foucault says 
 
“in the name of what anthropology must be in its essence in the whole of the 
philosophical field, reject all these ‘philosophical anthropologies’ which present themselves 
as a natural access to the fundamental. … Here and there one finds at play an illusion which is 
typical of Western philosophy since Kant.”262 
 
With this cautionary note, Foucault, in the final chapters of the Commentary, and as a 
transition to The Order of Things, criticizes various post-Kantian attempts that fail to observe 
this ‘Kantian lesson’263 in their attempts to ‘exert critical thought at the level of positive 
knowledge.”264 For Foucault, the underlying error of such attempts is that “the originary takes 
over the fundamental and ‘deploys itself without any difference from the problematic of the 
necessary to that of existence; it confuses the analysis of conditions and the interrogation of 
finitude. One day one will have to envisage the whole development of post Kantian 
philosophy from the perspective of this maintained confusion, of this denounced 
confusion.”265   
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In the Commentary, Foucault mentions Husserlian phenomenology as an example of 
such an attempt, that is, as that philosophical development which tries to “liberate the regions 
of the a priori from the forms in which reflections on the originary had confiscated it, 
[however] the effort to escape from the originary as immediate subjectivity ultimately referred 
to the originary conceived in the density of passive syntheses and of the already there.”266 
Here, Foucault refers to Husserl as the philosopher, who carries out the Kantian project of 
positing man both as subject and object (ultimately, a radicalization of the Cartesian project), 
by grounding the contents of our empirical knowledge “in the reality of the transcendental 
subject.”267 The primary problem however is that any modern conception of man, after Kant, 
cannot think of man in the way Descartes represented him, that is, man having an “immediate 
and transparent cogito”. As Gary Gutting explains, 
 
“…the modern notion of man excludes Descartes' idea of the cogito as a “sovereign 
transparency” of pure consciousness. Thought is no longer pure representation and therefore 
cannot be separated from an “unthought” (i.e., the given empirical and historical truths about 
who we are). I can no longer go from “I think” to “I am” because the content of my reality 
(what I am) is always more than the content of any merely thinking self (I am, e.g., living, 
working, and speaking—and all these take me beyond the realm of mere thought). Or, putting 
the point in the reverse way, if we use “I” to denote my reality simply as a conscious being, 
then I “am not” much of what I (as a self in the world) am.”268 
  
Consequently, Husserl’s transcendental subject is not the subject (pure, transparent 
cogito) of Descartes but it is the one that which includes the (empirical/historical) unthought 
as a part and parcel of man’s concrete existence. For Foucault, this problem remains 
unresolved in the works of Husserl’s ‘existentialist’ followers (such as Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty). Unlike Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty rejected taking refuge in a transcendental 
ego (or an outright return to a sort of Platonism as Husserl ultimately did) but instead, they 
“focused on the concrete reality of man-in-the world. But this, Foucault claims, is just a more 
subtle way of reducing the transcendental to the empirical.”269 
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Conclusion 
 
Foucault’s Commentary on Kant’s Anthropology is translated into English and 
published by Semiotext(e) in 2008. Such a long time had passed (the thesis itself was 
submitted in 1961) until its translation and publication, one wonders why such an alluring 
work remained in dark for all that time. Nobody, it seems, deemed it necessary to start the 
publication process earlier. There are several reasons for this.  
 
First, the Commentary hardly adds a new perspective to Kantian studies in general, 
although the Commentary is highly critical and energetically reflective in certain instances, 
the real target of the Commentary is not Kant himself or those who study Kant’s philosophy, 
but it is the post-Kantians who, as mentioned above, find great promise in the formalization of 
the field of epistemology, those that are obsessed with the search of man’s ‘origins’ with the 
faint belief that once that ideal point is recovered, we shall know the pristine moment when 
‘man’ is in his essential, purest status, and finally it is those anthropologies that focus on the 
essentialisation of ‘man’, whom Foucault wishes to address the criticisms in his Commentary. 
Although the Commentary’s importance is not about how much and in what ways it 
contributes to Kantian studies; its in depth analysis of Kantian philosophy (not only the 
Critiques, but also the Anthropology and the Opus Postumum as well) may erode ready-made 
opinions about the philosophical relationship between Kant and Foucault, i.e. a whole-hearted 
belief that Foucault rejects Kant entirely, and more importantly it gives us an insight into the 
first organized and productive contemplation by Foucault over Kantian critical enterprise, and 
thus, get a glimpse of Foucault’s Kantian foundations. Taking only The Order of Things into 
consideration, when a relationship is sought between Foucault and Kant, now seems as a 
grave mistake, and the ambivalence of Kant’s position in the book will be lost forever.       
 
 Second, the way Foucault engages in Kantian philosophy itself seems Husserlian 
rather than Kantian. That is, if we are to concern ourselves about the ‘anthropological 
slippage’ that Foucault warns us about; it is not because there is an inherent instability within 
the Critique itself, for ideas like “a priori of existence” although they might be familiar to 
Husserl, one cannot put forward the idea that these notions would make sense for Kant. The 
first step in the foundation of the Critique already excluded the possibility of an “inscription 
of the transcendental within the empirical”. This premise does not concern the critical 
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enterprise at all, which is primarily after the question of the possibility of “an agreement 
between experience and the conditions defined a priori by the transcendental subject.”270 
Notions such as ‘innate a priori’ or ‘concrete a priori’ are themes that belong to 
phenomenology rather than Kant’s Critique, notions that for Husserl, “makes possible the 
analysis of the creation of the ego.”271  
 
Foucault himself admits that the concept of ‘time’ in the Anthropology operates in a 
radically different way than that of the Critique: time operates as if it “undermines synthetic 
activity itself.”272 Thus, it is almost expected that a notion such as ‘density of becoming’ will 
find it difficult to find itself a meaningful place within the formations described in the 
Critique. As Han says,  
 
“The idea of an ‘emergence’ of the transcendental within becoming requires a 
different conception of temporality. This is indirectly confirmed by the rest of the 
Commentary, which indicates that in the Anthropology time is revealed as … that to which the 
subject is linked by ‘already effected syntheses’ which in a certain sense, always precede the 
active transcendental syntheses.”273 
 
However, the idea that Foucault’s Commentary does not contribute much to Kantian 
studies, primarily because it embeds itself in ,first, a critique of Husserlian phenomenology 
over Kant’s Anthropology and second, a critique of post-Kantians should not mean that the 
Commentary is without effect. The position of Kant within the Foucauldian oeuvre 
significantly changes in view of the Commentary, and close philosophical proximity between 
these two great philosophers is finally revealed. In light of the Commentary, the ambivalence 
of Kant in the final chapters of The Order of Things can finally be resolved, alongside with 
the nature of the dangers highlighted by Foucault in post-Kantian philosophies, namely The 
Analytic of Finitude, and the ‘anthropological slippage’. To better understand the concept of 
the ‘finitude’ and its central place in The Order of Things but this time in view of the 
Commentary let’s turn to the following passage: 
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 “In one sense, man is governed by labor, life and language: his concrete existence 
finds its determinations in them. (...) [Yet] all those contents (...) have positivity within the 
space of knowledge (...) only because they are thoroughly imbued with finitude. For they 
would not be there (...) if man (...) was trapped in the mute (...) opening of animal life; but nor 
would they posit themselves in the acute angle that hides them from their own direction if 
man could traverse them without residuum in the lightning flash of an infinite understanding. 
That is to say that each of these forms in which man can learn that he is finite is given to him 
only against the background of his own finitude. Moreover, the latter is not the most 
completely purified essence of positivity, but that upon the basis of which it is possible for 
positivity to arise. At the foundation of all the empirical positivities (...), we discover a 
finitude  which is in a sense the same (...) and yet is radically other.”274  
 
 In order to make sense of this difficult excerpt one has to distinguish between two 
different forms of finitude (empirical and transcendental) and of determination (causal and 
epistemic275). Man’s governance by life, labor, and language in his concrete existence refers 
to empirical finitude, that is, to those causal determinations which reside in the fact that man 
is determined by various processes in which he finds himself enmeshed and in which he has 
little or no control. Labor, language and life are the forms in which man can learn that he is 
empirically finite. However, such forms are also objects of knowledge (their empiricity can be 
turned into positivities so that man can learn about them under such disciplines as biology, 
economics or linguistics). No different than any other epistemological contents, “they are 
dependent on the transcendental aspect of ‘man’ which defines the conditions under which all 
empirical objects are epistemically determined.”276 Life, language and labor are part of those 
limitations, as Han says “that bear causally on empirical finitude, only ‘have positivity within 
the space of knowledge’ because they are ‘thoroughly imbued with finitude’: yet crucially, 
such finitude must now be conceived of at the transcendental level.”277 The reason for this, 
Foucault says, ‘man’ cannot ‘traverse them without residuum in the lightning flash of an 
infinite understanding’: a reference to Kant’s ‘intellectual intuition’ (intuitus originarius), that 
is, a Godly intellect which would not be dependent on the reception of sensory material and 
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could by itself produce a fully spontaneous knowledge of its object.278 Thus, since human 
beings lack this intellectual intuition, transcendental finitude is not an empirical matter (it is 
not the ‘completely purified essence of positivity’); it is a result of the transcendental 
condition that man cannot form any empirical knowledge unless one receives, through the 
faculty of sensibility, some external input: it is exactly because man is not only empirically, 
but equally and in connection with the first, also transcendentally finite, our transcendental 
finitude provides the epistemic conditions (‘that upon which it is possible for positivity to 
arise’) which allow the contents that causally determine us as empirical beings to enter the 
space of knowledge. Therefore, man can have knowledge insofar as he is limited, that is, it is 
because there are limits to our transcendental, and as much as to our empirical being, that we 
can “know” things.279 
 
 It is here that the anthropology and the analytic of finitude “will deploy themselves 
within the interface between the empirical and transcendental finitude on the one hand, causal 
and epistemic determination on the other: ‘at the very heart of empiricity, there is indicated 
the obligation to work backwards to an analytic of finitude, in which man’s being will be able 
to provide a [transcendental] foundation … for all these forms that indicate to him that he is 
not [empirically] infinite.”280 The problem here, however, arises out of the fact that, this 
ambiguous position of man, which both separates and unites the empirical and the 
transcendental, ultimately leads to an overlapping “by means of an implicit shift which makes 
epistemic determination ultimately dependent on its empirical, causal counterpart: the relation 
between the empirical and the transcendental becomes a vicious circle.281 This shift, explained 
in detail under the theme of the ‘originary’ reveals itself in the rest of the passage from The 
Order of Things quoted at large above: 
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 “And he, as soon as he thinks, merely unveils himself in the form of a being who is 
already, in a necessarily subjacent density, in an irreducible anteriority, a living being, and 
instrument of production, a vehicle for words which exist before him. All these contents (...) 
traverse him as if he were merely an object of nature.”282   
 
Beware of the multiple temporal locutions in the description of the epistemic 
positioning of man here! (‘as soon as he thinks’, ‘already’, ‘in an irreducible anteriority’, and 
‘which exist before him’) Here, we witness the originary at work! (‘already there’) Since man 
is, for Foucault, is definitely not ‘merely an object of nature’ the irreducible anteriority that he 
is describing cannot only be the empirical limitations to our knowledge: but where should we, 
then, direct the existence of these temporal locutions, or the originary for that matter? They 
mark (albeit metaphorically) the (retrospective) opening of the epistemic field. However, 
according to the clear distinction established by Kant in the Critique the opening of the 
epistemic field should not itself be temporal. Since the foundation of any possible 
representation lies in the a priori that renders it possible –thus lies beyond all possible 
experience- and since, for Kant, time is an a priori form of sensibility on which the possibility 
of conceiving chronological time depends: as a condition of possibility of experience, it 
cannot feature in the field that it determines.283 Yet, the theme of the originary in the 
Anthropology –as symbolized with the use of retrospective temporal locutions in the passage 
quoted above from The Order of Things- annuls this neat distinction by inscribing the opening 
of the epistemic field itself within the chronology of empirical time: thus the analytic of 
finitude is characterized by a paradox of retrospection whereby transcendental finitude is 
disclosed as pre-existing itself in the form of empirical finitude. This retrospective pre-
existence nullifies the ability of man to provide a universal and necessary foundation for 
knowledge.  
 
The empirical contents of knowledge which previously were recognized as causally 
determinant but epistemically determined attain a ‘quasi-transcendental’284 function in that 
“they are not viewed as chronologically primary and causally determinant for epistemic 
conditions themselves.”285 This means that the transcendental finitude of man finds itself 
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causally determined by the same empirical limitations (life, language, labor) that bear on its 
empirical counterpart. As Foucault says,  
 
“If man’s knowledge is finite, it is because he is trapped, without possibility of 
liberation, within the positive contents of language, labor and life [which thus indirectly 
become epistemically determinant by virtue of causally determining epistemic conditions]; 
and inversely, if life, labor and language may be posited in their positivity, it is because 
knowledge has finite forms [epistemic determination]”.286 
 
 Therefore, anthropology, as the philosophical attempt that produces only an ‘analytic 
of man’ by assigning the task for future philosophies to seek an answer chiefly to the question 
of ‘Was ist der Mensch?’, comes to dominate the (transcendental) field which was originally 
reserved for the Critique. In another passage from The Order of Things Foucault refers to this 
‘empirico-transcendental redoubling’ (or ‘doubling over of finitude over itself’) as the ‘Fold’:  
 
“By means of this question [Was ist der Mensch?] a form of reflection was constituted 
which is mixed in its levels and characteristic of modern philosophy. … It concerns an 
empirico-transcendental duplication by means of which an attempt is made to make the man 
of nature, of exchange, or of discourse, serve as the [transcendental] foundation of his own 
finitude. In this Fold, the transcendental is doubled over so that it covers with its dominating 
network the inert, grey space of empiricity; inversely, empirical contents are given life … and 
are immediately subsumed in a discourse which carries their transcendental presumption into 
the distance.”287  
 
In the final chapters of The Order of Things Foucault analyses the “network of radical 
misunderstandings and illusions”288 that results from ‘the Fold’, which is itself triggered by 
the inherent duality of man, as an empirico-transcendental double. Presented in this way, the 
analysis of the relationship of the Critique to the Anthropology (that is, the primary concern of 
the Commentary) gives us beforehand (or rather in a premature but insightful manner) the 
                                                 
286 Foucault, M. The Order of Things, p. 316 
287 Ibid. p. 341 
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Empirical and the Transcendental, The Cogito and the Unthought, and The Return of the 
Origin, respectively. 
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model of the circular fractures that Foucault puts forward clearly in the final chapters of The 
Order of Things, under the chapter entitled “The Analytic Of Finitude”, as mentioned before. 
The Commentary therefore, allows us to locate clearly the “prefiguration of the three doubles” 
within Kant’s own work (the Anthropology), and thus clears the ambivalence of Kant’s 
position in The Order of Things. 
 
Particularly with the description of Geist as the ‘nature’ of reason, Kant himself 
establishes the fundamental ‘empirical’ limit of reason in the Anthropology. From this 
empirical determination reason cannot rid itself through thought. Therefore, it faces its first 
“empirical determinations, which teaches it that it is neither unconditioned nor divine, reason 
painfully comes for the first time to understand its own finitude.”289 As Foucault says in the 
Commentary: “Geist would be this originary fact, which, in its transcendental version, implies 
that the infinite is never there.” This ‘originary passivity’ already precedes any transcendental 
constitutive activity and in The Order of Things this passivity is identified with the empirical 
and transcendental, and consequently epistemological limitations established by man’s life, 
labor and language. Therefore, ‘man’290 is trapped in an endless circularity whereby any 
attempt on his side to seize Geist, in order to get a hold of this most originary passivity, to 
understand it so that this paradoxical endless redoubling (since it is ‘conditioned’ in the order 
of things, and since reason cannot release itself from it in the order of knowledge, because in 
there it appears as ‘conditioning’- the originary) could come to an end, provokes only its 
disappearance over and again, thus its withering away from thought. This constant redoubling 
of the transcendental over the empirical is identified by Foucault in The Order of Things as 
one of the ‘doubles’, namely ‘the empirico-transcendental redoubling’ analyzed in Chapter 9 
under The Analytic of Finitude. 
 
Gary Gutting defines, first the analytic of finitude itself, and second, within it, the first 
double (that is, the empirical and the transcendental doubling) in the following way: 
 
“At the very heart of man is his finitude: the fact that, as described by the modern 
empirical sciences, he is limited by the various historical forces (organic, economic, 
linguistic) operating on him. This finitude is a philosophical problem because, this same 
historically limited empirical being must also somehow be the source of the representations 
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whereby we know the empirical world, including ourselves as empirical beings. I (my 
consciousness) must, as Kant put it, be both an empirical object of representation and the 
transcendental source of representations. How is this possible? Foucault's view is that, in the 
end, it isn't — and that the impossibility (historically realized) means the collapse of the 
modern episteme. What Foucault calls the “analytic of finitude” sketches the historical case 
for this conclusion, examining the major efforts (together making up the heart of modern 
philosophy) to answer the question.”291      
 
Geist, as Han defines it, “is that part of [reason] which reason attempts to recover by 
the movement of reflection, but which, as it is presupposed in the attempt itself, is destined to 
escape from reason.”292 Therefore, for Foucault, “Geist is the root of the possibility of 
knowledge. And because of this, it is indissociably present to and absent from the figures of 
knowledge.” It is always ‘present’ because it is responsible for reason’s first “originary 
rational impulse” but cannot be located (thus invisible) in the order of knowledge due to its 
“constitutive indeterminacy” as its nature. This aspect of Geist is defined in The Order of 
Things in the relation between “the cogito and the unthought”. Foucault says: 
 
“Man has not been able to describe himself as a configuration in the épistéme without 
thought at the same time discovering, both in itself and outside itself, at its borders yet also in 
its very warp and woof, an element of darkness, an apparently inert density in which it is 
embedded, an unthought which it contains entirely, yet in which it is also caught.”293   
 
What Foucault means in this quote is briefly the following: man finds himself already 
involved in a language which he cannot fully master, in a biological entity which he cannot 
fully penetrate with thought, etc., therefore, unthought –just as thought itself- has to be also 
taken as that basis in which he thinks and acts. Thus, if man wants to be fully intelligible to 
himself, this unthought that covers his existence entirely should be made accessible to 
thought, so that it can be mastered in action, “yet insofar as this unthought it its obscurity is 
precisely the condition of possibility of thought and action it can never be fully absorbed into 
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the cogito.”294 Therefore, as Foucault says, “the modern cogito … is not so much the 
discovery of an evident truth as a ceaseless task constantly to be taken afresh.”295 
 
Finally, the Commentary defines Geist as being at once visible and invisible in 
thought, and it can only appear in its empirical manifestation ‘as if it is already there’ (again, 
the theme of the originary). Its existence (and its determinacy) precedes the critical 
foundation, yet however, it becomes only visible through it (or, it can only be represented 
through it.) This ‘nature’ of Geist is responsible for “the efforts to conceive of an ever-elusive 
origin, to advance towards that place where man’s being is always maintained, in relation to 
man himself, in a remoteness and a distance that constitute him.”296 Here, Foucault comes 
close to Heidegger’s297 appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology, and particularly to the 
distinction he maintains throughout Being and Time between das Man (man as historically, 
socially, etc. constructed, or rather man both as historicized and historicizing) and Dasein 
(ahistorical ‘man’). Although Heidegger will seek the primordial and originary of Dasein’s 
being in the world, Foucault will seek the historical a priori. The origin of things (e.g., the 
origin of language that one speaks) always retreats from man, although it can be attained (or, 
regained) momentarily in the practices of, for instance, historicization, as Dreyfus and 
Rabinow puts forward, it  
 
“retreats again since these practices turn out to be inaccessible to the practitioners. 
Although man is defined by the cultural practices which establish the temporal clearing in 
which objects can be encountered, and this temporality is ‘preontologically close’ to man 
since it is his very being, he cannot reflect on what these practices are precisely because they 
are too near to him and thus too encompassing.”298  
 
Although, therefore, Geist animates reason primarily by means of ideas alone, and 
thus, it occupies the very root of its being, ontologically speaking, it lies in the farthest corner, 
receding back at every possible attempt to its capture. Hence, Heidegger says, in “The Letter 
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on Humanism”: “Being is farther than all beings and is yet nearer to man than every being.”299 
This aspect of Geist hints us the final ‘double’ of The Analytic of Finitude analyzed in The 
Order of Things, entitled “the retreat and the return of the origin.” 
 
In light of this detailed but necessary analysis of the Geist and its relation with the 
‘doubles’, which occupies the center of the discussion concerning Kant in The Order of 
Things reveals the Commentary as a central piece of work in the Foucauldian oeuvre if one 
wants to analyze the nature of the philosophical relationship between Kant and Foucault. It is 
obvious by now that the Commentary is nowhere near being an utterly marginal text to be 
discarded as far as the Foucauldian corpus is concerned in its entirety, “the Commentary 
functions as a matrix from which to interpret the Foucauldian critique of anthropology, in a 
way constituting the philosophical ‘prehistory’ of the archaeological texts.”300 Therefore, the 
ambiguity of Kant’s position mentioned in the earlier chapters is finally resolved: in light of 
the Commentary one sees that it is not the Critiques that mark “the threshold of our 
modernity”, it is the division within the Kantian corpus itself that this division is established: 
namely, between the Critiques and the Anthropology, which is demonstrated by the inflection 
of the transcendental theme. ‘Man, as that strange empirico-transcendental double’ is not a 
concern for the Critique when it is taken only by itself, thus, the break that is established by 
Kant that separates the modern épistéme from its Classical counterpart is not the result of the 
Critique itself but only when it is taken together with the Anthropology that the paradoxical 
dual nature of man is revealed within the Kantian critical enterprise. It is only then, what 
Foucault refers to as “the anthropological sleep” gains meaning and takes its place as the 
primary character of modernity. The inflection of the transcendental theme is responsible for 
the three deadlocks (‘man and his three doubles’, explained with their relation to Geist above) 
that threaten our contemporary thought. The Anthropology therefore opens the way for that 
self-contradictory philosophico-anthropological tradition, by seeking “within the empirical for 
a knowledge that could have transcendental value, as the ‘turn towards the empirical’ 
attempted is sufficient in itself to empty of all meaning the concept of a transcendental 
foundation.”301  
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As a result, Foucault’s own philosophical attempts will be about whether it is possible 
to free the philosophical field from this confused anthropologization, and whether it is 
possible to provide a secure ground for the conditions of possibility of knowledge whereby 
the a priori is not tarnished by the ‘anthropological slippage’: hence the reasons Foucault’s 
‘historical a priori’. Similar to Nietzsche and Heidegger, Foucault first turns to history, and 
from there to the épistéme and finally to the ‘archive’ in search for a foundation for his 
philosophy. However, as the Commentary shows by revealing the strong Kantian overtone in 
the philosophy of Foucault at least during the archeological period, we witness that Kant 
never ceases to occupy a central place within the Foucauldian oeuvre and in fact, his own 
philosophical journey starts with taking up the critical question asked by Kant (the conditions 
of possibility of knowledge), only to find answers by other means and methods. Foucault’s 
own ‘archaeology’ itself perhaps has Nietzsche as its surrogate father, but Kant remains as its 
initiator, who according to Foucault defined ‘archeology’ as “the history of what makes a 
certain form of thought necessary.”302  
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